Policy Options to Mitigate Cigarette Filter Litter in California by Wechsler, Max
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Master's Projects and Capstones Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects
Spring 5-20-2016
Policy Options to Mitigate Cigarette Filter Litter in
California
Max Wechsler
mwechsler@usfca.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.usfca.edu/capstone
Part of the Environmental Health Commons, Environmental Studies Commons, Models and
Methods Commons, and the Other Pharmacology, Toxicology and Environmental Health
Commons
This Project/Capstone is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects at USF Scholarship: a digital
repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Projects and Capstones by an authorized administrator
of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wechsler, Max, "Policy Options to Mitigate Cigarette Filter Litter in California" (2016). Master's Projects and Capstones. 842.
https://repository.usfca.edu/capstone/842
 
This Master's Project 
 
 
 
Policy Options to Mitigate Cigarette Filter Litter in California 
 
 
by 
 
 
Max Wechsler 
 
 
 
is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of:  
 
 
 
Master of Science 
in 
Environmental Management 
 
 
 
at the  
 
 
University of San Francisco 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Submitted:      Received: 
 
 
 ................................………….   ...................................……….. 
 Your Name                      Date   Allison Luengen, Ph.D.      Date 
 
 
 
		
ii	
Table of Contents 
List of Tables	........................................................................................................................	iii	
List of Figures	.......................................................................................................................	v	
List of Appendices	...............................................................................................................	vi	
List of Acronyms	.................................................................................................................	vii	
Abstract	..............................................................................................................................	viii	
Acknowledgements	..............................................................................................................	ix	
I.	Introduction	........................................................................................................................	1	
II. Financial Costs	.................................................................................................................	8	
Abatement Costs	................................................................................................................................	9	
Abatement Costs for Local Governments	.......................................................................................	9	
Abatement Costs for Businesses	...................................................................................................	11	
Abatement Costs for Volunteer Organizations and Educational Institutions	................................	11	
Total Abatement Costs	..................................................................................................................	12	
Discussion: Keep America Beautiful	............................................................................................	13	
Discussion: Adopt-a-Highway	......................................................................................................	14	
Damages to the Coastal Tourism Industry	.......................................................................................	14	
Damages to the Fishing Industry	.....................................................................................................	15	
Fire Damages	...................................................................................................................................	16	
Human and Domestic Animal Ingestion	..........................................................................................	17	
Quality of Life	.................................................................................................................................	18	
Total Financial Costs	.......................................................................................................................	20	
Discussion: The California Tobacco Control Program	....................................................................	21	
Discussion: Kier Associates	............................................................................................................	22	
III.	Environmental Damages	...............................................................................................	22	
Toxicity	...........................................................................................................................................	23	
Formation of Microplastics	.............................................................................................................	27	
The Precautionary Principle	............................................................................................................	28	
IV.	Policy Evaluation	..........................................................................................................	30	
Litter Mitigation Policy Theory	.......................................................................................................	31	
Market-Based Instruments	...............................................................................................................	33	
Tax	................................................................................................................................................	33	
Fee	.................................................................................................................................................	39	
Charge	...........................................................................................................................................	46	
Price Floor	.....................................................................................................................................	47	
Regulatory Policy Instruments	........................................................................................................	47	
Consumer Behavior Regulation	....................................................................................................	48	
Locational Smoking Bans	...........................................................................................................................	48	
Minimum Age Requirement	........................................................................................................................	50	
Littering Fines	.............................................................................................................................................	50	
Discussion: Producer Pays Principle	...........................................................................................................	53	
Extended Producer Responsibility and Product Stewardship	........................................................	53	
		
iii	
Discussion: Outreach and Consumer Education	.........................................................................................	59	
Discussion: Infrastructure	...........................................................................................................................	61	
Design for Environment	..............................................................................................................................	64	
Deposit-Refund	.............................................................................................................................	66	
Product Ban	...................................................................................................................................	73	
California Product Ban Options	...................................................................................................	76	
Discussion: Federal Legislation	..........................................................................................	78	
Clean Water Act	..............................................................................................................................	78	
Coastal Zone Management Act	.......................................................................................................	79	
Discussion:	Recent	California	Legislative	Action	.................................................................	80	
V.	Conclusion	......................................................................................................................	81	
Management Recommendations	......................................................................................................	82	
References	...........................................................................................................................	85	
Appendices	........................................................................................................................	102	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
iv	
List of Tables 
	
Table 1. Estimations of generation, weight, and volume of CFL	.............................................	1	
Table 2. Litter characterization of the 2012 International Coastal Cleanup	.............................	3	
Table 3. Calculation of the “CA CFL-ALR”	............................................................................	3	
Table 4. Abatement costs for local government entities, methodology 1	...............................	10	
Table 5. The total cost to abate CFL for government entities in California	...........................	11	
Table 6. The historic annual cost to abate CFL for entities in California	...............................	13	
Table 7. Total annual CFL-related fire damages in California	...............................................	17	
Table 8. Total annual financial costs to California	.................................................................	20	
Table 9. Assimilative and precautionary principle policy approaches	...................................	29	
Table 10. Allocation of California State Cigarette Tax	..........................................................	36	
Table 11. Potential global impact of 10% increase in price of cigarettes	...............................	37	
Table 12. Fees and charges, consumption, and litter in 6 locations	........................................	40	
Table 13. Characterization of San Francisco 2009 and 2014 litter audits	..............................	42	
Table 14. San Francisco abatement fee revenue, 2010-2015	..................................................	43	
Table 15. San Francisco Department of Public Works budget for street sweeping	................	43	
Table 16. CFL collected by San Francisco volunteer organizations in 2016	..........................	44	
Table 17. Litter reduction after implementing deposit-refund programs	................................	68	
Table 18. Recycling rates of bottles: states with and without bottle bills	...............................	69	
Table 19. Top 5 litter items found in Hawaii in 2007	............................................................	73	
Table 20. Street litter before and after San Francisco product bans	.......................................	75	
Table 21. Policy option pro’s and con’s	.................................................................................	82	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
v	
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1. U.S. market share and total annual sales of cigarettes 1925-1993 ............................ 2 
Figure 2. Adult smoking prevalence, 1988 – 2013 ................................................................... 6 
Figure 3. Per capita cigarette consumption, 1980-2013 ........................................................... 6 
Figure 4. Pedestrian reasons for a low cleanliness rating in San Francisco ........................... 19 
Figure 5. Factors determining lower street and sidewalk cleanliness in San Francisco ......... 19 
Figure 6. California Tobacco Control Program budget, fiscal year 2011-2012 ..................... 21 
Figure 7. Possible pathways for human health risks caused by CFL ...................................... 23 
Figure 8. Concentration-response curve for topsmelt ............................................................. 25 
Figure 9. Concentration-response curve for fathead minnow ................................................. 25 
Figure 10. Potential pathways for the transport of microplastics. .......................................... 28 
Figure 11. Policy instruments throughout the product life-cycle ........................................... 32 
Figure 12. 2014 State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates .................................................................. 35 
Figure 13. Plastic bags as a percentage of Ireland’s national litter composition .................... 40 
Figure 14. General flow for “cradle-to-grave” materials management .................................. 54 
Figure 15. G.I.S. model designed to predict CFL in San Diego ............................................. 63 
Figure 16. Flow chart for deposit-refund payout structure ..................................................... 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
vi	
List of Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Global littering rate inference ……………………………………...…………...5 
Appendix 2. California and U.S. CLR-ALR’s………………………………………………...7 
Appendix 3. California and U.S. adult smoking prevalence ratio…………………………….7 
Appendix 4. California and U.S. per capita cigarette consumption ratio ………..............…...7 
Appendix 5. Business abatement calculation, methodology 1…………………………...….13 
Appendix 6. Business abatement calculation, methodology 2………………….…………...14 
Appendix 7. Volunteer organization abatement cost calculation……………………….…...14 
Appendix 8. Educational institution abatement cost calculation……………………….……14 
Appendix 9. Calculation of tourism industry damages……………………………………....17 
Appendix 10. Calculation of fishing industry damages …………………………...………...17 
      Appendix 11. Calculation of overall fire damages…………………...……….......................18 
Appendix 12. Calculation of indirect fire damages………………………………………….19 
      Appendix 13. Calculation of death and injury costs…………………………………………19    
Appendix 14. Kier Associates California CFL cost………………………………………….24      
Appendix 15. Abatement budget calculations: Kier Associates vs. San Francisco …………24 
Appendix 16. Calculation of state tax CFL mitigation fund…………………………………38 
Appendix 17. Calculation of California cigarette fee…………………………………..……45 
Appendix 18. Calculation of California cigarette litter abatement fee………………………47 
Appendix 19. Estimation of CFL collected in Vancouver…………………………...………64 
Appendix 20. Estimation of Litterati CFL-ALR……………………..………………………65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
vii	
List of Acronyms 
 
CA CFL-ALR………………………….....California Cigarette Filter Litter to All Litter Ratio 
CFL............................................................................................................Cigarette Filter Litter 
PS- EPR………………...……Product Stewardship and/or Extended Producer Responsibility 
WEEE………………………………………..…...Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
 
  
		
viii	
Abstract 
Approximately 16.2 billion cellulose acetate cigarette filters are littered in California 
annually. Cigarette filter litter (CFL) creates an annual financial burden of over $1.27 billion 
for California; 67% of these costs involve abatement efforts, 26% involve damages to the 
tourism industry, 4% involve damages created by fires, and 3% involve damages to the 
fishing industry. CFL also poses unquantifiable damages to human and environmental health 
in the form of ingestion, toxicity, formation into microplastics, and quality of life 
degradation. These costs and damages warrant the adoption of policy measures in order to 
mitigate CFL. Cigarette taxes and fees raise government revenue, but they are politically 
challenging due to California Proposition 26. Charges and price floors are not subject to 
Proposition 26 but do not raise government revenue. Locational smoking bans encourage 
anti-smoking cultural norms and may decrease consumption, although indoor smoking bans 
may increase littering and outdoor smoking bans are poorly enforced. Raising the minimum 
cigarette purchasing age should reduce consumption but may take years to reach 
effectiveness. The enforcement of littering fines is a feasible option to decrease CFL 
generation. California could mandate that a product stewardship organization be funded by 
relevant stakeholders to provide and maintain a system that recovers CFL, or the state could 
implement a CFL deposit-refund model. Both of these options contain operational and 
administrative risks and are recommended to be piloted in Hawaii before consideration at the 
scale of California. A product ban on filtered cigarettes would mitigate certain environmental 
risks but may not mitigate toxic contamination. Recent tobacco control regulation in 
California suggests that the most effective and feasible strategy to mitigate the negative 
externalities created by cigarette consumption and its generation of litter may be a 
combination of regulatory and market-based policy instruments.  
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I. Introduction  
Cigarette filter litter (CFL) is defined as one or multiple cigarette filters—commonly 
referred to as “butts”—that are intentionally discarded in a public environment after 
consumption. CFL is a massive environmental and economic problem that needs to be 
mitigated in order to ensure human and environmental health. Globally, approximately 6.3 
trillion cigarettes are consumed annually and approximately 83% of these cigarettes contain 
filters (Novotny & Zhao 1999). In the U.S., between 97% and 99% of cigarettes sold contain 
filters (Novotny et al. 2009, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2014). 95% of 
cigarette filters are made out of the plastic cellulose acetate (Register 2000). In 2008, 
690,000 metric tons (773,000 U.S. tons) of cellulose acetate were globally manufactured for 
cigarette filters (Puls et al. 2011). One piece of CFL—with no remnant tobacco—weighs 
.006 ounces and has the volume of .5 mL (Register 2000). In the U.S. alone, 1.35 trillion 
filtered cigarettes were manufactured in 2007 (Novotny et al. 2009), yet only 360 billion 
cigarettes were consumed domestically during the same year (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 2007); this latter figure decreased to 292.8 billion in 2011 (Table 1, Center for 
Disease Control 2012).  
 
Table 1. Estimations of generation, weight, and volume of CFL 
Assumes a 65% littering rate (Curtis et al. 2016, Schultz et al. 2013, Register 2000).  
 
 
Cigarette filters were originally intended to keep loose tobacco out of smokers’ 
mouths, but then filters were developed as a marketing tool in the 1950’s and 1960’s when 
information about the negative health effects of smoking first become publicized (Harris 
2011, Novotny et al. 2009, Smith & Novotny 2011, Novotny & Slaughter 2014, Register 
2000). In 1950, only 0.54% of cigarettes in the U.S. market had filters (Figure 1, Hoffman & 
Hoffman 1997). By 1990, about two-thirds of cigarettes had filters with increased ventilation 
holes that the tobacco industry labelled as “low tar”; although these filters reduced tar 
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delivery as measured by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission protocol, they did not reflect 
reduced risks of disease or premature mortality in smokers (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 2014). Advertised benefits of cigarette filters have been misleading, 
fraudulent, and defective in terms of protecting human health (Novotny & Slaughter 2014). 
Cigarette filters are often defective, releasing small fragments of cellulose acetate when 
smoked (Pauly et al. 2002). Investigations substantiating defective filters have been 
concealed by the tobacco industry, which has been negligent in not performing toxicological 
examinations to assess the human health risks posed by defective filters (Pauly et al. 2002).   
 
 
Figure 1. U.S. market share and total annual sales of cigarettes 1925-1993 
Filtered and unfiltered cigarettes (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2014). In 
1950, 0.54% of cigarettes had filters (Hoffman & Hoffman 1997). Today, between 97% and 
99% of cigarettes contain filters (Novotny et al. 2009, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 2014). 
 
CFL is a visible representation of what should be a political alliance between 
environmental and public health advocates (Smith & McDaniel 2011). CFL is the most common 
type of litter found on Earth by count (Javadian et al. 2015). Although monitoring CFL in the 
environment is difficult because it can easily be transported by wind and rain into street drains, 
streams, rivers, and the ocean (Novotny et al. 2009), it is estimated that between 4.5 and 4.95 
trillion cigarettes are discarded as litter annually on a global scale (Moerman & Potts 2011, 
Novotny & Slaughter 2014). It is possible that CFL accounts for 38% of all U.S. roadside litter, 
implying that there are over 19.3 billion pieces of CFL in the U.S. (Keep America Beautiful & 
Mid Atlantic Solid Waste Solutions 2009). An annual international coastal cleanup effort 
recovered over 2.1 million pieces of CFL around the world in one day in 2012, accounting for 
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19% of all litter items observed (Table 2, Ocean Conservancy 2012). I have analyzed the 
International Coastal Cleanup data and concluded that CFL comprises 36.3% of all observed 
litter in California by count; here, this figure is referred to as the “California CFL compared to all 
litter ratio”, abbreviated as “CA CFL-ALR” ( 
Table 3). In this report, I utilize the CA CFL-ALR in order to make certain 
calculations.  
 
Table 2. Litter characterization of the 2012 International Coastal Cleanup  
Over 560,000 volunteers collected this data in 91 countries (Ocean Conservancy 2012).  
 
 
Table 3. Calculation of the “CA CFL-ALR” 
The ratio of CFL compared to all observed litter in California during the annual International 
Coastal Cleanup. Data provided by Ocean Conservancy (2016).  
 
 
It is difficult to estimate the percentage of cigarettes that are discarded as litter due to 
human behavior. In the U.S., a 65% CFL public littering rate was observed amongst 9,757 
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subjects. Here, the 65% littering rate is accepted as a reliable figure because of its large 
sample size as well as geographic relevancy, although it should be noted as conservative 
compared to the other findings. A 77% CFL littering rate has been observed for 219 smoking 
subjects in an urban New Zealand environment (Patel et al. 2012). The aforementioned 
global production figures—combined with the estimated global littering rates—suggest that 
between 71% and 82.5% (average = 76.9%) of filters are littered globally (Appendix 1). A 
“two-thirds” CFL littering rate was found by the non-profit organization Litter Free Planet 
and cited throughout some literature (Novotny & Slaughter 2014, Javadian et al. 2015), 
although the finding is not properly cited itself (Litter Free Planet 2012).  
One particularly problematic and uncertain aspect of CFL is its degradability. 
Cellulose acetate is synthesized when cellulose—which is a natural polymer found in 
wood—is acetylated with acetic anhydride to produce cellulose acetate strands (Harris 2011). 
Titanium dioxide is added to the strands as a whitening agent, and triacetin binds the strands 
together to form a filter (Harris 2011). Although cellulose is readily biodegraded by 
organisms that utilize cellulase enzymes, due to the additional acetyl groups, cellulose acetate 
requires the presence of esterases (hydrolase enzymes) in order to initiate biodegradation. 
Partial deacetylation can occur either by enzymes or by partial chemical hydrolysis, and then 
the polymer’s cellulose structure can be readily biodegraded (Puls et al. 2011). 
Although there is a consensus that CFL is photodegradable (Puls et al. 2011), there 
has been an arena of debate in the scientific literature regarding its persistence in a natural 
environment (Novotny 2009, Puls et al. 2011). This includes a disagreement over the 
definition of biodegradation. Biodegradation can be defined as the microbial-initiated 
conversion of a substrate in a biologically active environment into carbon dioxide, methane, 
cell wall material, and/or other biological products (Puls et al. 2011). Another perspective is 
that all materials biodegrade given a certain time frame and therefore the definition of 
biodegradation must include a rate function, such as weight loss over time (Puls et al. 2001). 
More about CFL degradation will be discussed in the microplastics section as well as the 
sustainable alternatives section; for now, it can safely be assumed that CFL persists as litter 
after it has been discarded. 
Given the scale and ubiquity of CFL, a body of peer-reviewed scientific literature has 
emerged over the last decade that specifically addresses environmental and economic 
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impacts of CFL and then evaluates policy options for its mitigation (Novotny et al. 2009, 
Ariza & Leatherman 2011, Barnes 2011, Schneider et al. 2011, Smith & McDaniel 2011, 
Novotny & Slaughter 2014, Curtis et al. 2016). However, certain academic avenues have not 
been pursued, including: 1) a comprehensive integration of these studies; 2) an evaluation of 
damages incurred by CFL within an actual scope of assessment, and; 3) a feasibility 
assessment of policy options to mitigate CFL within a particular jurisdiction. This paper aims 
to address these areas of interest and carry forward previous research in order to realistically 
implement policy that effectively mitigates CFL in the State of California.   
California was chosen for many reasons. Firstly, it was deemed to be a challenging 
but reasonable scale in terms of ascertaining relevant data. Secondly, it has historically been 
one of the first U.S. states to pass innovative environmental policies—specifically policies 
that mitigate litter—such as the state plastic bag ban and the microbeads ban. Thirdly, I live 
in San Francisco, California, and I have both an interest in my place of residence as well 
more access to local informational resources. California is an interesting case study because 
its observed CFL-ALR is 17% higher than the national average even though its adult 
smoking prevalence and its per capita consumption of cigarettes are respectively 35% and 
43% lower than the rest of the U.S. (Figure 2 and Figure 3, Appendices 2, 3, and 4). 
Approximately 24.9 billion cigarettes are consumed in California every year, and assuming a 
65% littering rate, it is estimated that 16.2 billion pieces of CFL are annually littered in the 
state (Table 1). In effect, the generation of CFL in California equates to a weight over 6 
million pounds and a volume over 8,000 cubic meters in material (Table 1). 
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Figure 2. Adult smoking prevalence, 1988 – 2013 
Adult smoking has been declining steadily since 1988. California has had a lower smoking 
prevalence compared to the rest of the U.S. (California Tobacco Control Program 2013). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Per capita cigarette consumption, 1980-2013 
Consumption has consistently decreased in both California and the U.S. (not including 
California) since 1980. Californians have generally smoked about 20 packs less per capita 
than the rest of the U.S. This decrease is correlated with state cigarette taxes, denoted by the 
passage of Propositions 99 and 10 (California Tobacco Control Program 2013). 
		
7	
Statement of Purpose 
 
My three main research questions are: 1) what are the quantifiable financial costs that 
CFL creates for California? 2) what are the environmental impacts of CFL imposed upon 
California? 3) What policy mechanisms could most effectively mitigate CFL in California? 
For all intents and purposes, the first two questions are support the third, as the scope and 
scale of the issue determine the appropriateness of implementing any particular policy 
mechanism.  
The first section of this report assesses economic and environmental damages that 
CFL creates for California. I will assess the financial burden that CFL has historically cost 
the state by evaluating abatement costs, fire damages, and damages done to the fishing 
industry and coastal tourism sector. Due to inherent complexity and/or unavailable data, 
other costs will be qualitatively assessed, including damages caused by child and domestic 
pet ingestion as well as damages to the human “quality of life”. Then, I will qualitatively 
assess other negative externalities—such as toxicity, animal ingestion, and degradation into 
microplastics—caused by the unabated CFL that enters natural ecosystems. Taken together, 
the economic and environmental damages caused by CFL to the State of California will 
justify the adoption of policy mechanisms designed for its mitigation.   
The second major section evaluates policy instruments that could most effectively 
mitigate CFL in California. First, the theory behind each option will be explained in brief. 
Then, relevant examples of each policy mechanism as applied to various cases and places 
will be offered and analyzed in terms of effectiveness. Finally, each policy option will be 
assessed for feasibility in the State of California. Major factors that will be considered 
include demographic data, economic factors, social behaviors, legislative history, established 
infrastructure, and the current political climate. The most feasible policy option(s) will be 
recommended for adoption to California policy makers. When relevant, I will review and 
assess certain bodies of past research as it pertains to this purpose.  
Note that this report does not address two related topics: 1) the negative externalities 
created in the upstream production of cellulose acetate filtered cigarettes; 2) the liability that 
CFL creates for landfills when discarded “properly”. The cellulose acetate filtered cigarette 
manufacturing process requires fossil fuels as an input, and it produces solid, liquid, and 
airborne wastes (Novotny & Zhao 1999). This waste is not litter so it is not assessed here, but 
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it is acknowledged here. Meanwhile, even when CFL is not littered, it may create 
environmental risks by producing toxic leachate in landfills. The scope of the cigarette filter 
problem extends beyond litter; however, this report focuses on litter only. More about CFL 
toxicity will be discussed in the environmental damages section as well as the product ban 
section.  
II. Financial Costs  
This section attempts to quantify the financial costs that CFL has created for various 
stakeholders in California. Until now, no studies have accounted for how CFL-related 
costs—such as harm to businesses, tourism, ecosystems, and human health—amount in a 
particular jurisdiction (Schneider 2011). I calculate cost using different methodologies, 
almost always synthesizing scientific literature, government data, and/or consulting reports. 
These costs reflect what entities have historically been spending to abate or remediate 
damages, not necessarily what should be spent to truly mitigate CFL damages. Various 
methodologies are utilized depending on the available data. Whenever more specific data 
could be found, an attempt was made to incorporate those findings into a given methodology 
in order to ensure accuracy. Sometimes I used multiple methodologies to calculate the same 
cost; when this happened, the average of each calculation was used here provided that each 
result fell within the same order of magnitude (which was always the case). Any adjustment 
for inflation was found using the online consumer price index calculator (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2016). Some calculations utilize the 36.3% CA CFL-ALR.   
The following financial costs will be assessed for the state: 1) abatement costs (the 
cost to clean up CFL) for various entities; 2) damages to the coastal tourism industry; 3) 
damages to the fishing industry, and; 4) damages caused by CFL-related fires. Other 
financial costs include human ingestion and degradation of the quality of life, but because of 
unavailable data, they are offered here for qualitative assessment. Also, note that there are 
federally-mandated litter mitigation programs in California that will be discussed towards the 
end of this report; however, the California taxpayer money funding such programs, which 
may be substantial, is not assessed here. 
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Abatement Costs 
Litter abatement costs typically include mechanical and manual remediation from 
public places such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, as well as storm water and sewer 
treatment systems (Schneider et al. 2011). Here, California CFL abatement costs are 
quantified for state, county, and city governments, as well as for businesses, volunteer 
organizations, and educational institutions.  
 
Abatement Costs for Local Governments 
My abatement cost methodology for government entities first calculates the costs that 
these entities spend to abate all litter in California. In order to do so, findings are 
incorporated from the Keep America Beautiful & Mid Atlantic Solid Waste Solutions (2009) 
report which surveyed hundreds of entities responsible for litter abatement and then 
determined per capita litter costs using data analytics techniques. I then multiply these per 
capita costs by the appropriate California population in order to calculate litter costs at the 
state, county, and city levels. Finally, these costs are multiplied by the CA CFL-ALR in order 
to estimate abatement costs for CFL only. I acknowledge that this latter step assumes that the 
cost to abate CFL is the same as the cost to abate any other form of litter. This may not be 
true, but the step was necessary in order to extrapolate from general litter reports in order to 
make a best estimate.    
In order to estimate litter abatement costs to state governments, Keep America 
Beautiful and Mid Atlantic Solid Waste Solutions (2009) assessed 51 survey responses from 
state government affiliated entities such as departments of transportation, departments of 
environmental protection, state Adopt-a-Highway programs, and state Keep America 
Beautiful coordinators. A national annual litter cost of $362.5 million was determined at the 
state level, yielding a per-capita cost of $1.19. Here, this per capita cost is multiplied by the 
population of California as well as the CA CFL-ALR to yield an annual cost of $18.8 million 
to California state government entities (Table 4). This may be a conservative estimate. The 
California Department of Transportation has estimated that the cost to remediate CFL is $41 
million annually, and although this estimation has been cited throughout grey literature 
(California Legislative Information 2015), the original source could not be located. However, 
another state government report stated that it spent $63 million in 2013 on the removal of 
		
10	
litter and debris on roadways only (McGowen 2015); applying the CA CFL-ALR to this 
figure yields a CFL cost of $22.9 million for (only) one state department. Averaging the 
$22.9 million from this latter methodology with the $18.8 million from the previous 
calculation yields a cost of $19.9 million, and this figure is my (probably conservative) final 
estimate of costs to California state government entities. 
 
Table 4. Abatement costs for local government entities, methodology 1 
Per capita abatement costs for all litter are multiplied by the appropriate population as well 
as the CA CFL-ALR and the CPI index for 2016 (Keep America Beautiful & Mid Atlantic 
Waste Solutions 2009, U.S. Census 2012, U.S. Census 2015, U.S. Department of Labor 
2016). 
 
 
For county governments, Keep America Beautiful and Mid Atlantic Solid Waste 
Solutions (2009) received 105 survey responses from county level entities that incur litter 
costs, such as highway and road departments, public works departments, and solid waste and 
recycling departments. County responses were stratified by population and extrapolated to 
determine a $1.06 per capita cost. Here, this per capita cost is multiplied by the California 
population and the CA CFL-ALR to yield $16.7 million in CFL abatement costs to county 
governments in California (Table 4).  
For city jurisdictions, Keep America Beautiful and Mid Atlantic Solid Waste 
Solutions (2009) received survey responses from 108 litter-burdened city entities, such as 
departments of public works, sanitation, landscaping, and streets. The result was a national 
cost of $797.3 million, equating to a $3.59 per capita cost for residents in U.S. cities. When 
adjusted for CFL composition and California city population, the resulting cost is $53.8 
million for California city-level government entities (Table 4).  
The total historic cost that local government entities in California have been spending 
to abate CFL is calculated to be $90.4 million (Table 5).  
		
11	
 
Table 5. The total cost to abate CFL for government entities in California 
A summary of my findings, largely calculated using data from Keep America Beautiful & 
Mid Atlantic Solid Waste Solutions (2009).  
\ 
 
Abatement Costs for Businesses 
Businesses may be spending an order of magnitude greater than governments towards 
remediating CFL, although survey results indicate that business owners are not aware of 
these costs (Keep America Beautiful & Mid Atlantic Solid Waste Solutions 2009). Using the 
previous methodology, Keep America Beautiful & Mid Atlantic Solid Waste Solutions 
(2009) surveyed 111 businesses through a random sample and concluded that the average 
annual cost of litter mitigation per-employee is $79.48. Accounting for the number of 
employees in California, this translates to a $429.3 million cost after accounting for the CA 
CFL-ALR and inflation (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015, Appendix 5).  
I use another methodology to estimate business abatement costs by incorporating data 
from a litter audit in Florida which found that the average business spends $2,435 annually to 
abate litter (State University System of Florida, 1999). Incorporating a 33% CFL-total litter 
composition ratio in Florida yields an annual cost of $808 for businesses to abate CFL; 
multiplying this cost by the number of businesses in California and adjusting for inflation 
yields a cost of California business CFL abatement of approximately $1 billion (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2015, Appendix 6).  
The average of these two methodologies yields a historic CFL abatement cost to 
California businesses of $719.6 million. 
   
Abatement Costs for Volunteer Organizations and Educational Institutions   
The methodology used here for calculating CFL abatement costs incurred by 
volunteer organizations and educational institutions incorporates findings from the Keep 
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America Beautiful & Mid Atlantic Solid Waste Solutions (2009) report. It is different from 
the previous methodologies because it deduces the national costs incurred by these entities to 
the scale of California; this is because certain data were unavailable such as the per capita 
cost or the size of the relevant population.  
For volunteer organizations, Keep America Beautiful & Mid Atlantic Solid Waste 
Solutions (2009) estimated the value of volunteer time by averaging the minimum wage and 
the national value of volunteer time; then it extrapolated a national cost to the 4.6 million 
volunteers in such organizations as Adopt-a-Highway, the Ocean Conservancy, Keep 
America Beautiful affiliates, and other non-affiliated volunteer groups. The result is $677.6 
million in time and $92 million in office costs, educational materials, and media. A per capita 
assessment of volunteer costs is not provided, so here California costs are adjusted by 
dividing the U.S. population by that of California. The California volunteer cost to abate 
litter is then adjusted with the CA CFL-ALR and 2016 inflation to yield a cost of volunteer 
efforts to abate CFL in California of $38.1 million (Appendix 7).  
For educational institutions, Keep America Beautiful & Mid Atlantic Solid Waste 
Solutions (2009) collected survey data from 19 school districts and 18 colleges and 
universities using surveys of maintenance, facilities, and janitorial departments. The result 
was a national litter abatement cost of $240.6 million, resulting in a per capita cost of $3.63. I 
could not locate the population of post-secondary level students in California, so I used the 
same previous deductive methodology to calculate the cost of CFL abatement to California 
educational institutions; the result is $11.9 million (Appendix 8). This estimation is 
complicated by California state law prohibiting minors from purchasing cigarettes.  
 
Total Abatement Costs 
It is estimated that business, government, volunteer, and educational entities have 
historically been spending $860 million to abate CFL in California (Table 6).  
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Table 6. The historic annual cost to abate CFL for entities in California 
A summary of my various abatement cost calculations.  
 
 
 
Discussion: Keep America Beautiful  
The two Keep America Beautiful studies mentioned in this report (Keep America 
Beautiful & Mid Atlantic Solid Waste Solutions 2009, Keep America Beautiful & Action 
Network 2009) were both sponsored by Philip Morris USA, a corporation that manufactures 
and distributes cigarettes and includes the brands Marlboro, Virginia Slims, Benson & 
Hedges, Parliament, as well as 13 others. Keep America Beautiful was developed as a 
marketing tool in order to control the possibility of problematic alliances between tobacco 
control groups and environmentalists, as well as to shift the burden of responsibility of 
handling CFL away from manufacturers and onto consumers, government agencies, and non-
profit organizations (Smith & McDaniel 2010). By reporting with statistical significance that 
most smokers litter and that cigarette receptacles are effective for CFL mitigation, Big 
Tobacco can argue that the industry is not accountable for the negative externalities created 
by its products (Smith & Novotny 2010). Although the Keep America Beautiful campaign 
may have conducted the self-reported largest and most thorough national litter study to date 
(Rath et al. 2012) with certain intentions, its findings have provided a wealth of valuable data 
that can be used to make a variety of arguments. The Keep America Beautiful studies have 
sound methodologies with large sample sizes, and their findings are not wrong; it is true that 
smokers litter (as has been seen) and that the provision of infrastructure reduces litter (as will 
be seen). Nonetheless, these observations do not exempt cigarette manufacturers from 
responsibility, as will be discussed later in the extended producer responsibility and product 
stewardship sections.   
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Discussion: Adopt-a-Highway 
States have many options to reduce litter, and the Adopt-a-Highway program is a 
promotional campaign funded by local and state governments to encourage volunteers to 
remediate highway litter in exchange for some form of advertising (Waterfront Partnership of 
Baltimore & Abell Foundation 2011). The program Sponsor-a-Highway is similar except that 
the organization pays professional contracts due to safety concerns (Waterfront Partnership 
of Baltimore & Abell Foundation 2011). Adopt-a-Highway programs are relatively costly 
and have limited reach, covering 35% of state maintained highways at best (Waterfront 
Partnership of Baltimore & Abell Foundation 2011). Adopt-a-Highway sites average 
between 9% and 15% less litter than non-adopted highways; it is possible that people litter 
more when they know that a remediation system is in place (Waterfront Partnership of 
Baltimore & Abell Foundation 2011). Paid programs involve similar problems, and litter 
areas tend to return to pre-cleaning conditions within 7 to 31 weeks (Waterfront Partnership 
of Baltimore & Abell Foundation 2011). This data suggests that litter prevention is more 
effective than remediation.  
In contrast, states such as Hawaii and Washington have implemented comprehensive 
litter control programs that combine education, public awareness, anti-litter legislation, 
beautification programs, and litter law enforcement to prevent litter. Funding local programs 
alone is not sufficient for success, and a state-level program manager is recommended to 
monitor and direct anti-litter efforts; such programs have reduced litter by about 75% 
(Waterfront Partnership of Baltimore & Abell Foundation 2011). However, these 
comprehensive litter control programs required constant funding to cover costs—
approximately $0.23 per item recovered—and make take as many as 8 to 15 years to take full 
effect (Waterfront Partnership of Baltimore & Abell Foundation 2011. 
 
Damages to the Coastal Tourism Industry  
CFL can damage the tourism industry by creating aesthetic intangible costs that 
diminish the public’s perception of the image and reputation of an area, leading to decreased 
tourism numbers and revenue (Ten Brink et al. 2009, Mouat et al. 2012). California’s coastal 
economy includes such sectors as construction, living resources, minerals, ship and boat 
rental, tourism and recreation, and transportation (Kildow & Colgran 2005). Litter also 
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causes losses to tourism by degrading habitats and killing wildlife (Kier Associates 2013). 
The state’s wildlife viewing sector is estimated to have a non-market value on the order of 
tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars (Pendleton 2006). Adjusted for 2016 inflation, 
California’s coastal tourism and recreation sector is $31 billion (Kildow & Colgran 2005). 
Ten Brink et al. (2009) reported that the Swedish tourism industry was negatively impacted 
between 1-5% by the accumulation of litter, particularly along beaches, due to a loss of 
economic opportunities caused by aesthetic perception and possible health concerns. To 
estimate the cost that CFL damages California coastal tourism, I have multiplied the average 
(3%) of this latter finding by the CA CFL-ALR and the value of the California tourism 
economy to yield an annual cost of $336 million (Appendix 9).  
 
Damages to the Fishing Industry  
Damages to the California fishing industry are estimated by multiplying the value of 
California fishing catches by an estimated contamination rate of fishing catches due to 
maritime litter. Then, this figure is adjusted for the CA CFL-ALR as well as inflation. In 
2001, the California fishing economy employed over 1,300 people, included wages of $68.8 
million, and created a gross state product of $177.5 million, including $100,000,000 in the 
value of catches (Kildow & Colgran 2005). Marine litter could cost the fishing industry as 
much as 5% of total revenue (Mouat et al. 2010). In two separate cases, contamination rates 
of fishing catches caused by marine litter have been reported at 69% and 82% (Ten Brink et 
al. 2009, Mouat et al. 2010). The average of these contamination rates (75.5%) is multiplied 
by the value of California fishing catches to estimate costs of damages caused by marine 
litter. This figure is then adjusted for the CFL-litter ratio as well as 2016 inflation to yield an 
annual cost to California fishing catches caused by CFL contamination of $36.7 million 
(Appendix 10). It should be noted that the “living resources” category of California’s coastal 
economy—which includes the fishing industry and the aquaculture industry as subsets—was 
estimated to be $726 million in 2001 (Kildow & Colgran 2005). Data regarding marine litter 
costs to aquaculture is lacking; although Mouat et al. (2010) suggested that marine litter does 
not damage controlled aquaculture systems as much as it damages fishing catches, the 
aquaculture industry is about twice the size of the fishing industry in California.  
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Fire Damages 
CFL creates fire risks (Patel et al. 2012, Rath et al. 2012, Markowitz 2013, National 
Fire Protection Association 2013). Here, the annual damages caused by these fires will be 
quantified in the following order: 1) direct property damages; 2) indirect costs associated 
with fire mitigation; 3) cost of civilian death, and; 4) cost of civilian injury. Taken together, 
these damages will approximate how much CFL-caused fires have historically cost 
California. 
In order to estimate direct property damages caused by CFL, I synthesize census data 
with data provided by the National Fire Protection Association. Between 2007 and 2011, on 
yearly average, U.S. fire departments responded to 90,000 fires that were caused by smoking 
materials (Hall 2013). Most of these fires were caused by unextinguished filters igniting 
upholstery or bedding within a building (Hall 2013); as per the definition of litter, these costs 
are excluded for the purposes of this report. The 21% of cigarette-related fires began by the 
ignition of vegetation caused by CFL are assessed here (Hall 2013). The Hall (2013) report 
included data regarding the national average number of fires, civilian deaths, civil injuries, 
and value of direct property damage caused by cigarette-related fires. When adjusted for the 
percentage of fires caused by littered filters, as well as the California population, CFL in 
California is calculated to produce the following fire damages: 1) 3,792 fires; 2) 3 civilian 
deaths; 3) 9 civilian injuries; and 4) $3.8 million in direct property damage (Appendix 2). 
This is probably a conservative estimate because the climate of California creates more fire 
risks than the national average, especially given that the provided national data overlapped 
with the state’s historic drought (Herring 2015).   
In order to estimate indirect costs associated with CFL-related fires, I utilize 
empirical data to calculate a ratio of indirect damages compared to direct damages 
historically incurred by fires. Indirect costs associated with fires include: 1) business 
interruption; 2) temporary shelter costs; 3) funds for public fire departments; 4) the cost of 
the provision of fire protection within buildings, 5) insurance costs; and 6) medical costs 
(Markowitz 2013). In 2009, fires caused $15.4 billion in direct property damage and $149.6 
billion in indirect property damage (Karter 2010). In effect, it is inferred that indirect 
damages have historically incurred about 9.7 more costs than those incurred by direct 
damages. It has been calculated that the direct costs caused by CFL-related fires in California 
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are $3.8 million. Multiplying this figure by the 9.7 indirect-to-direct cost ratio yields about 
$37.3 million in annual indirect costs caused by CFL-related fires in California (Appendix 
12). 
In order to quantify the costs of civilian injury and death caused by CFL-related fires, 
I incorporate data from a study that has estimated costs of occupational injury and death. 
Adjusted for inflation, the average cost of an occupational death is calculated to be $955,000, 
and the average occupational injury is estimated to be $18,000 (Leigh et al. 1997, Appendix 
13). Given the estimated average number of deaths and injuries caused caused by CFL-
related fires in California, annual financial costs to the state are estimated to be $3.1 million 
and $167,000 respectively (Appendix 13).  
The total annual costs caused by CFL-related fires in California is estimated to be 
$44.4 million (Table 7).  
 
Table 7. Total annual CFL-related fire damages in California 
A summary of my fire damage cost calculations.  
 
 
Human and Domestic Animal Ingestion  
CFL has created costs for human beings that are difficult to quantify due to 
unavailable data. For example, between 2006 and 2008, there were 10,573 reported cases in 
the U.S. of children (aged <6 years) ingesting CFL (Connolly et al. 2010). It is not reported 
how many of these cases involved trips to hospitals; these would be real, but difficult to 
quantify costs. Nicotine found in CFL may cause vomiting and neurological toxicity in 
human infants and animals (Novotny et al. 2009). In another study, of the 679 cases of CFL 
ingestion reported, 357 included health effect data (Appleton 2011). Of these, 69% had no 
effect, 28% had a minor effect, and 2% had a moderate effect such as nausea or vomiting. 
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Psychological trauma put on the families associated with child CFL ingestion could be 
included as a qualitative cost. Between 2005 and 2010, 848 cases of CFL ingestion by 
domestic pets (94% canine) have been reported (Novotny et al. 2011). This data point 
suggests costs in the form of veterinarian visits and psychological trauma, although this is 
difficult to quantify especially given the possible number of unreported cases.  
 
Quality of Life 
Another real but intangible cost caused by CFL is a negative effect on the “quality of 
life”, meaning the subjective well being of individuals and societies. Litter can impact the 
quality of life by reducing recreational opportunities, aesthetic values, and non-use values 
(Cheshire et al. 2009). The perception of litter in the residential environment negatively 
affects the quality of life (State University System of Florida 1999, Healton et al. 2011). A 
San Francisco survey determined that CFL is the primary reason given by pedestrians when 
determining street and sidewalk cleanliness (Figure 4); 48% of those surveyed described CFL 
as an “extremely important” factor when judging cleanliness (Figure 5). Keep America 
Beautiful & Mid Atlantic Solid Waste Solutions (2009) surveyed homeowners, business 
development officials, real estate agents, and property appraisers and concluded that the 
presence of litter in a community could reduce the value of a property by as much as 7%; 
however, due to the methodology used to determine this figure, no extrapolations to 
California are made here.   
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Figure 4. Pedestrian reasons for a low cleanliness rating in San Francisco 
(Fairbank, Maslin, Maulin, Metz & Associates 2011).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Factors determining lower street and sidewalk cleanliness in San Francisco 
(Fairbank, Maslin, Maulin, Metz & Associates 2011).  
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Additionally, the “broken windows theory” suggests that a small sign of disorder in a 
given neighborhood—including litter, graffiti, and vandalism—can serve as a catalyst for 
future offenses (Harcourt & Ludwig 2006). It is well-documented that littering behavior 
increases in a littered setting compared to a clean setting (Bator et al. 2011, Finnie 1973, 
Geller et al. 1977, Krauss et al. 1978). The presence of litter can increase further littering 
behavior and may even increase theft in certain situations (Keizer et al. 2008). The 
perception of high street-level litter and graffiti is correlated with feelings of anxiety and 
depression (Ellaway et al. 2009). Depression and anxiety have been correlated with other 
health outcomes, including high smoking rates (Ellaway et al. 2009), thus suggesting a 
possible feedback loop between smoking and litter. According to the broken windows theory, 
CFL may have residual negative impacts on the human quality of life. Although these 
damages are difficult to quantify, clinicians and policy makers are increasingly recognizing 
the importance of measuring the quality of life in order to inform decisions (Guyatt et al. 
1993). 
 
Total Financial Costs 
The total annual financial costs that have been historically incurred by various entities 
in California due to CFL is calculated to be $1.277 billion (Table 8). 
 
Table 8. Total annual financial costs to California 
A summary of my financial cost calculations.   
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Discussion: The California Tobacco Control Program 
 
The California Tobacco Control Program is funded mostly by the California 
Department of Public Health and has the purpose to dissuade Californians from smoking 
using outreach and advocacy (California Tobacco Control Program 2016). In the fiscal year 
2011-2012, the program was appropriated $70 million, $20 million of which was funded by 
the California Department of Education (Figure 6). The question is raised: should this 
money, funded by the California taxpayer, be included when determining costs associated 
with CFL damages to state? After all, the program effectively reduces CFL generation 
whenever cigarette consumption is reduced; eliminating the program would increase the 
generation of CFL. One could make the argument that (at least a portion of) the $70 million 
should be included in the state’s CFL cost determination. However, for the purposes of this 
assessment, the state’s anti-smoking outreach program budget is not included, using the logic 
that CFL mitigation is a residual effect unassociated with the program’s intended purpose. 
This cost exclusion adds an element of conservation to my total cost estimate. If the 
California Tobacco Control Program were to incorporate into its mission statement a concern 
regarding the environmental and human health hazards created by CFL, however, then this 
cost should certainly be included in a cost analysis.     
 
 
Figure 6. California Tobacco Control Program budget, fiscal year 2011-2012 
(California Tobacco Control Program 2016).  
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Discussion: Kier Associates 
In 2013, Kier Associates, a fisheries and watershed consulting agency, was contracted 
by the Natural Resources Defense Council to conduct a study that quantified annual costs to 
mitigate litter spent by California “communities”, meaning cities, counties, and municipal 
agencies. This study will be analyzed here in brief for a comparative analysis. The bottom 
line reported was $428 million (Kier Associates 2013). If the CA CFL-ALR were applied to 
this figure, the cost incurred by cigarettes to the state would be $155 million (Appendix 14) 
which is substantially lower than my estimate. The scope of the Kier Associates study 
focused on damages to waterways, and it compiled data from 95 communities to assess costs 
associated with storm water capture, storm drain cleaning and maintenance, waterway and 
beach abatement, other manual abatement, and education. It appears that the study assessed 
neither costs incurred upon state level entities nor business abatement costs. In the report, the 
per capita cost categories that fall under the responsibility of a department of public works—
street sweeping and manual abatement—translate to about $5 million for the population of 
San Francisco, whereas in reality the city’s budget for such programs is $34.7 million, almost 
an order of magnitude higher (Appendix 15). Additionally, costs that were acknowledged but 
not quantified were damages to tourism, damages to the fishing industry, and damages to 
maritime vessels. Taken together, these factors may explain why the Kier Associates (2013) 
California litter cost estimates are lower than my own.   
III. Environmental Damages 
This section assesses environmental risks caused by CFL through a review and 
synthesis of scientific literature and government reports. CFL creates possible pathways for 
hazardous effects on human health through direct exposure, bioaccumulation in the food 
chain, and volatization and polarization into toxic compounds (Figure 7). Here, toxicity, 
ingestion, and degradation into microplastics will be assessed. Then, an explanation of the 
precautionary principle will contextualize these findings and suggests the importance of CFL 
mitigation through policy implementation.  
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Figure 7. Possible pathways for human health risks caused by CFL 
CFL can directly affect human and animal health, bioaccumulate up food chains, and volatize 
and polarize into various media (Novotny & Slaughter 2014).  
 
Toxicity  
When cigarettes are smoked, toxic substances are absorbed into cellulose acetate 
filters. A combusted cigarette releases between 4,000 and 7,000 airborne chemical 
compounds, including at least 69 known human carcinogens such as carbon monoxide, 
hydrogen cyanide, nitrogen oxides, heavy metals, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, 
ammonia, acetaldehyde, formaldehyde, benzene, argon, pyridines, ethyl phenol, and acetone 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2010, Curtis et al. 2016). Indeed, one piece 
of CFL may contaminate up to 1,000 liters of water above the predicted no-effect 
concentration (Roder Green et al. 2014). CFL has been observed to create an environmental 
loading of heavy metals including Cd, Cr, Cu, Pb, and PAH’s, as well as Ar and nicotine 
(Moriwaki et al. 2009). Another study found CFL to be a point source for metal 
contamination—including Al, Ba, Cr, Cu, Fe, Pb, Mn, Ni, Sr, Tr, and Zn—thus increasing 
the risk of acute harm to local organisms (Moerman & Potts 2011). With that said, CFL as a 
whole is a non-point source of pollution, meaning that it can not be attributed to a single 
identifiable source and that its impacts occur diffusely over a wide area (EPA Victoria 2012).  
The research involving CFL’s impact on organisms has been recent and will now be 
presented in chronological order. CFL leachate has been shown to significantly increase 
acute toxicity for cladoceran, a small crustacean (Register 2000, Micevska et al. 2005). 
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Certain species of plants may grow higher and have longer roots than those those exposed to 
CFL, suggesting that there may be a connection between CFL and the depletion of soil 
nutrients (Dahlberg et al. 2006). LC50 values have been calculated with exposure to CFL 
leachate for two species of fish—the marine topsmelt (Atherinops affinis) and the freshwater 
fathead minnow (Pimephales promelas)—the LC50 values were found to be approximately 
one cigarette filter per liter (Slaughter et al. 2011). Notably, it was found that unsmoked 
cigarette filters (with no tobacco) increased toxicity; LC50 values were determined to be 5.1 
and 13.5 filters per liter respectively for each species (Figure 8 and Figure 9, Slaughter et al. 
2011). CFL has been observed to attract female Asian tiger mosquitos (Aedes albopictus) and 
then lethally affect its progeny (Dieng et al. 2013). Different concentrations of CFL leachate 
have been observed to alter the heart rate, development, behavior, and mortality of Japanese 
rice fish (Oryzias latipes) embryos (Lee & Lee 2014). Significant lethal and sub-lethal effects 
of CFL leachate have been reported for three species of tidepool snails (Booth et al. 2015). 
House finches (Carpodacus mexicanus) using CFL to line their nests were found to have a 
positive correlation with hatching success, fledging success, and chick immune response 
because the CFL acted as a pesticide; however, genotoxicity in the blood cells also increased 
with the proportion of CFL in the nests, suggesting that the CFL’s negative impacts may 
outweigh its benefits (Suarez-Rodriguez & Garcia 2015). Taken together, this body of 
literature suggests that CFL could qualify as household hazardous waste as defined by the 
U.S. EPA because it exhibits toxicity, meaning harm or death when ingested or absorbed 
(Novotny & Zhao 1999). More about toxicity will be discussed in the product ban section.  
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Figure 8. Concentration-response curve for topsmelt 
LC50 values for the fathead minnow from smoked cigarette butts (filter + tobacco), smoked 
cigarette filters (no tobacco) and unsmoked cigarette filters (no tobacco). Error bars represent 
one SE of the mean. Dose-response curves are significantly different (p<.05) (Slaughter et al. 
2011).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Concentration-response curve for fathead minnow 
LC50 values for the fathead minnow from smoked cigarette butts (filter + tobacco), smoked 
cigarette filters (no tobacco) and unsmoked cigarette filters (no tobacco). Error bars represent 
one SE of the mean. Dose-response curves are significantly different (p<.05) (Slaughter et al. 
2011).  
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Ingestion 
  
Ingestion is inherently difficult to monitor, and so are its effects. For example, 
consider a fish that ingests CFL and experiences sub-lethal effects; then the weakened fish is 
eaten by a larger fish. How should that sub-lethal effect be qualified, or even known known 
in the first place? Linking mortality unequivocally to ingested debris is difficult (Moore 
2008) so it is important to conceptualize how non-lethal impediments caused by ingestion 
could lead to fatal consequences. Plastic ingestion can block gastric enzyme secretion, 
diminish feeding stimulus, lower steroid hormone levels, delay ovulation, and cause 
reproductive failure, reduce food uptake, and cause internal injury and death due to the 
blockage of the intestinal tract (Derraik 2002). The ingestion of plastic materials has been 
documented in 267 species, including 111 species of seabirds, 26 species of marine 
mammals, and 6 species of sea turtles (Moore 2008, Sheavly & Register 2007). The extent to 
which cellulose acetate filters contribute to this problem is undocumented, and it may be 
valuable for future research to audit and database animal plastic ingestion.  
Ingestion would not be such an environmental hazard if CFL was biodegradable. Puls 
et al. (2011) conducted an extensive literature review regarding the biodegradability of 
cellulose acetate and stated that some of the initial assessments of the biodegradability of 
cellulose acetate in the 1970’s reached incorrect conclusions because the deacetylation 
process was not recognized, and the review went as far to state that cellulose acetate is 
“generally recognized as a biodegradable polymer within the scientific community”. This 
contradicts more recent literature that directly or indirectly referenced Hon (1977) to state 
outright that cigarette filters are non-biodegradable (Smith & McDaniel 2011, Smith & 
Novotny 2011, Marah & Novotny 2011). One report has stated that CFL may take many 
decades to degrade (Dahlberg 2006), while others have argued that although cellulose acetate 
is technically biodegradable, it is resistant to degradation and can persist for over 18 months 
even under optimal biodegradation conditions (Novotny & Zhao 1999, Ach 1993). Another 
recent study found that CFL has a low degradation rate, losing only 38% of its mass after two 
years (Bonanomi et al. 2015). Notwithstanding, the problem remains that even when a filter 
degrades into smaller fragments, the result may simply transfer the risk to a similar but  
smaller scale.  
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Formation of Microplastics 
The exact definition of microplastics has varied across the scientific literature, but it 
is generally accepted that microplastics are less than 5mm in diameter (Andrady 2011). In 
contrast to primary microplastics that are directly manufactured—such as microbeads—
secondary microplastics are derived from the breakdown of larger macroplastics (Thompson 
et al. 2009). The disintegration of CFL is impeded by a highly entangled network of 
approximately 12,000 fibers—each about 20 µm in diameter—which are fused together by 
plasticizers (Novotny et al. 2009) but over time, cellulose acetate photodegrades into smaller 
molecule fragments, reducing the the average molecular weight of the plastic polymer and 
weakening the material (Andrady 2011). Weathering processes degrade plastics and transport 
the microparticles to water sources (Andrady 2011). Fragmented plastic, even when invisible 
to the human eye, can undergo further degradation through microbial-mediated 
biodegradation whereby the carbon is converted into C02 and incorporated into marine 
biomass (Andrady 2011). Environmental degradation of plastics can also occur thermally and 
through hydrolysis (Andrady 2011).    
Microplastics create environmental risks including ingestion, toxic leachate, and the 
disassociation of extraneous pollutants adhered to the microplastics (Cole et al. 2011). The 
available pathways for the transport of microplastics are complex (Figure 10). Microplastics 
introduce toxins to the base of the marine food chain, leading to bioaccumulation (Teuten et 
al. d2009). Ivar Do Sul & Costa (2013) performed a survey of 101 peer-reviewed reports and 
found that all of the studied marine organism groups are at an eminent risk of interacting with 
microplastics. The potential for CFL to degrade into secondary microplastics creates 
environmental risks that are complex, wide scale, microscopic, and difficult to monitor.   
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Figure 10. Potential pathways for the transport of microplastics.  
These pathways are inherently complex and difficult to monitor (Wright et al. 2013).  
 
The Precautionary Principle 
Future CFL mitigation policy action should be warranted due to a recognition of the 
precautionary principle. The precautionary principle serves as a framework for 
environmental policy decision making involving uncertain risks, such as complex and poorly 
understood systems (Kriebel et al. 2001). The principle seeks to address negative 
externalities by: 1) taking preventative action in the face of uncertainty; 2) shifting the 
burden of proof to the proponents of a potentially harmful product; 3) exploring alternatives 
to potentially harmful actions; and 4) increasing public education in decision making 
(Kriebel et al. 2001). Table 9 presents a qualitative comparison between the precautionary 
principle and the assimilative principles—which has been the traditional framework for U.S. 
policy decision making—as they pertain to marine litter (Williams 1996). 
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Table 9. Assimilative and precautionary principle policy approaches 
The two principles are compared and contrasted for addressing marine litter. U.S. 
governments have traditionally implemented policy under the assimilative capacity approach, 
although more recently the precautionary principle has been utilized as a guiding framework 
(Williams 1994).  
 
 
 
Although the U.S. became bound to utilize the precautionary principle on the federal 
level when it signed and ratified the Rio Declaration, the framework has not been widely 
adopted because of the influence of commercial interests in the political process (Tickner et 
al. 2007). New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts have utilized the precautionary 
principle in order to regulate cleaning products at schools, pest management products, and 
900 industrial chemicals, respectively (Bowling 2008, Tickner et al. 2007). In 2003, San 
Francisco became the first local government in the U.S. to incorporate the precautionary 
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principle into the city’s environmental code; the code frames and develops health and 
environmental policies (Tickner et al. 2007). Utilizing the precautionary principle, in 2007 
California passed legislation that banned the manufacture, distribution, and sale of children’s 
toys containing toxic chemicals including phthalates and bisphenol-A (Tickner et al. 2007).  
A need to incorporate the precautionary principle as a means to mitigate CFL has 
been suggested several times throughout the literature (Barnes 2011, Novotny & Slaughter 
2014, Javadian et al. 2015). The damages caused by CFL are difficult to measure as they 
involve complex and uncertain risks including the following factors: 1) large quantities of 
generation on a global scale; 2) wide geographic dispersion in a variety of ecosystems; 3) 
physical characteristics, such as small size, buoyancy, and potential to degrade into 
microplastics; 4) unknown toxic effects of both cellulose acetate and the combusted 
chemicals in a cigarette that may be transmitted through ingestion and leachate, and; 5) 
unknown interactions with other ecological risks such as climate change (Williams 1996). 
The precautionary principle strongly suggests that policy makers prevent the generation of 
CFL. The following section explores the available policy options that California has to do so.  
IV. Policy Evaluation 
 
Now that damages have been assessed, this section evaluates a variety of policy 
options that California has to mitigate the negative impacts caused by CFL. First, the general 
theory is explained of how and why policy mechanisms can address litter. Governments have 
implemented a variety of policy mechanisms in order to mitigate the damages caused by litter 
(Derraik 2002, McIlgorm et al. 2011, Oosterhuis et al. 2014). These policy options generally 
fall into one of two categories: market-based instruments and regulatory policies. Market-
based instruments alter prices in a given market as a means to achieve a certain goal; this 
category includes taxes, fees, charges, and price floors. Regulatory instruments require or 
prohibit certain activities, products, or behaviors; this category includes locational smoking 
bans, minimum purchasing age requirements, littering fines, extended producer responsibility 
and product stewardship programs, and product bans. 
For each policy option, I will generally follow the same assessment format: 1) the 
theoretical purpose of each policy tool; 2) relevant cases and places; 3) the effectiveness of 
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previous implementation, and; 4) feasibility for implementation in California. Effectiveness 
may involve multiple metrics such as CFL remediation, a reduction in cigarette consumption, 
and/or economic efficiency. Feasibility in California involves various factors including 
demography, economy, culture, infrastructure, geography, and political climate. Finally, I 
will recommend the best policy option(s) for California environmental policy decision 
makers.  
 
Litter Mitigation Policy Theory  
This section explains the general concept as to why and how there are policies 
designed to mitigate CFL in the first place. Litter is a negative externality; market prices for 
litter-producing products do not reflect the burden that the product places on various people 
and entities (Schneider et al. 2011). Environmental economic theory suggests that CFL is as a 
“public bad”, meaning a negative externality that is both non-excludable and non-rival 
(Oosterhuis et al. 2014). Non-excludability refers to the concept that everyone is somewhat 
affected by the negative impacts of CFL; non-rivalry refers to the concept that the damages 
imposed by CFL on an entity do not reduce the damages imposed upon another (Oosterhuis 
et al. 2014). Those responsible for creating these negative externalities, whether the cigarette 
manufacturer or the littering consumer, do not incur the full costs of their actions (Oosterhuis 
et al. 2014). There is a missing market for CFL in the environment, meaning that those 
contributing to CFL and those that demand to reduce it do not meet to negotiate solutions to 
the problem—and even if there were, high transaction costs would make this market 
inefficient (Oosterhuis et al. 2014).  
Even though governments have already determined that citizens have the theoretical 
property right to an un-littered environment—as implied by the passage of anti-litter laws—
there is still a burden on the damaged parties to make things right because these laws have 
poor enforcement, according to Maggie Winslow, professor of environmental economics at 
the University of San Francisco (M. Winslow, personal communication, March 11, 2016). 
Opponents to government regulation on litter might invoke the Coase theorem, an economic 
theory which argues that government regulation of negative externality-producing activities 
is unnecessary because affected parties will negotiate an efficient outcome amongst 
themselves over time (Keohane & Olmstead 2007, Guhl & Hughes 2006). However, the 
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Coase theorem only holds true when transaction costs between parties are negligible. 
Transaction costs become surmountable between two parties involved in an environmental 
conflict of interest when certain phenomena occur, such as: 1) a large number of firms or 
individuals contribute to the problem; 2) information about damages is not widespread; and 
3) firms or individuals act strategically in bargaining situations (Keohane & Olmstead 2007). 
Policy instruments are put in place in order to account for these missing criteria in certain 
markets and create a more efficient economy.  
Determining the effectiveness of a policy depends on what goals are desired by policy 
makers. Here, the overarching metric for effectiveness is the reduction of CFL in the 
environment. However, the goal could be the reduction of a particular risk, such as removing 
plastic or toxic substances from the environment or reducing the financial costs that CFL 
places on society. In any case, policy makers should strive to achieve a certain goal in the 
most cost-effective means possible (Walls 2006). Cost-effectiveness can theoretically be 
measured by comparing the marginal costs and benefits for mitigating a certain extent of 
litter (Keohane & Olmstead 2007), assuming that the data is available. Policy mechanisms 
can be designed to reach certain goals by influencing different stages of the targeted 
material’s product life-cycle (Figure 11). Multiple policy instruments may be needed to 
accomplish certain goals because one instrument may not efficiently do so (Walls 2006).  
 
 
Figure 11. Policy instruments throughout the value chain 
The boxes represent stages of a product’s life cycle. Policies can affect different stages of the 
value chain. The term “green procurement” is similar in concept to “design for environment” 
to be discussed in the product stewardship section (Hogg et al. 2011).  
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Market-Based Instruments 
 
Theory  
Market-based instruments—sometimes referred to as “market-based economic 
instruments” or “economic instruments”—comprise a category of policy options that 
addresses inherent market flaws by creating a price signal, meaning a change in the cost or 
price of a market good or service, or by creating a new market with allowable trading 
systems (Ten Brink et al. 2009). This category includes taxes, charges, fees, fines, liability 
and compensation schemes, subsidies, price floors, incentives, and tradable permit schemes 
(Keohane & Olmstead 2007, Ten Brink et al. 2009). Depending on which of these 
instruments is implemented, a market-based instrument can change behavior, such as 
reducing production or consumption, and/or raise revenue for a governing agency. When the 
goal is to raise an amount of revenue that reflects the cost of the negative externality, the 
policy is sometimes said to reflect the “polluter pays principle” or “full cost recovery” (Ten 
Brink et al. 2009). As a policy tool, market-based instruments generally require less 
resources than regulatory instruments because the desired behavioral changes should 
naturally occur through market forces if the instruments are implemented correctly (Keohane 
& Olmstead 2007). Although it is widely acknowledged that market-based instruments tend 
to be more economically efficient than regulatory instruments, market-based instruments 
may require supporting regulations or targets in order to function properly (Hogg et al. 2011). 
Increasing the price of cigarettes is an evidence-based tobacco control strategy that can 
produce substantial long-term improvements in health by reducing consumption (Ribisl et al. 
2010). Also, jurisdictions with policies that raise the price of cigarettes are correlated with 
having fewer fires (Markowitz 2013). Here, I assess the feasibility and potential effectiveness 
of market-based instruments as applied to CFL mitigation in California. 
 
Tax 
Theory 
A tax is a market-based instrument that places a surcharge on a product or activity 
whereby the surcharge is remitted to a governing agency in a fund to be used for general 
public benefits; there does not need to be a direct relation between the tax paid and the 
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benefit that a taxpayer receives (Smith & McDaniel 2011, Hogg et al. 2011). Taxes can be 
levied at different points in the value chain, and the collected tax revenue can be allocated in 
different ways. The goal of a tax can be two-fold: it can both reduce consumption of a 
harmful product as well as raise revenue for the government (David 2011, Ten Brink et al. 
2009). If the goal is to maximize revenue for the government, an optimal tax incorporates the 
concept that consumers purchase less of a given product when its price is higher; this is 
known as Pareto-efficiency (Guhl & Hughes 2006). Empirical studies indicate that historic 
tax rates imposed on cigarettes are often far below the level of maximizing tax income 
(David 2011). 
Determining an effective tax is influenced by the willingness for a customer to pay 
for a product once its price is increased; this concept, known as demand elasticity, will now 
be discussed. Economists calculate demand elasticity for consumer goods in order to assess 
market conditions and predict how a market-based instrument could raise government 
revenue (Keohane & Olmstead 2007). Elasticity can be calculated through empirical studies 
when the price of a commodity changes. Generally, a commodity with an elasticity above the 
absolute value of 1 is said to be elastic, while a commodity with an elasticity below 1 is 
considered to be inelastic (Keohane & Olmstead 2007). Next, I will assess the effectiveness 
of prior taxes on cigarettes in terms of reduced consumption and revenue procurement.  
   
Examples 
For human health reasons, cigarettes have been taxed in various jurisdictions. In 
1995, the U.S. federal excise tax on cigarettes was $0.24 per pack; in 2009, the tax was raised 
to $1.01 per pack. During the same period, the average state excise tax increased from $.33 to 
$1.20 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2009). The federal tax is allocated to 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program in order to address human health issues (Jamison et 
al. 2009).  
In California, ballot initiative proposition 99 was passed in 1998, placing a $0.25 tax 
on every pack of cigarettes sold; the tax fund partially supported tobacco control programs 
throughout the state (California Department of Public Health & California Tobacco Control 
Program 2015). Statewide per capita cigarette consumption declined significantly afterwards 
(California Department of Public Health & California Tobacco Control Program 2015). 
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Currently, the California tax on cigarettes is $0.0435 per unit ($0.87 per pack), which ranks 
the state as number 32 in the nation (Figure 12); for comparison, New York has a $4.35 tax 
per pack (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2009). Of this $0.87, the revenue 
is allocated as such (Table 10): 1) $0.50 is allocated to the California Children and Families 
Trust Fund, which develops programs that encourage proper childhood development; 2) 
$0.25 is allocated into the Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund, which may use the 
revenue to develop tobacco-related health education programs disease research, medical and 
hospital care for low-income residents, and programs for fire prevention, environmental 
conservation, and the enhancement of state and local parks and recreation; 3) $0.10 is 
allocated into the Cigarette Tax Fund, and; 4) $0.02 is allocated to the Breast Cancer Fund 
(California State Board of Equalization 2015). The Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax 
Fund is allocated towards fire prevention, environmental conservation, and the enhancement 
of parks.  
 
 
Figure 12. 2014 State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates 
Per pack of 20 cigarettes. Local taxes are not included (Emmanuel & Borean 2014).  
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Table 10. Allocation of California State Cigarette Tax 
(California Board of Equalization 2015).  
 
 
Logistically, California distributors pay the $0.87 tax by purchasing cigarette tax 
stamps from the State Board of Equalization, and the distributors are required to affix the 
stamp to each pack before distribution; importantly, distributors pass the tax on to their 
customers, effectively rendering a higher retail selling price (California State Board of 
Equalization 2015). There are also fixed and annual cigarette licensing fees placed on 
registered retailers, wholesalers, distributors, manufacturers, and importers (California State 
Board of Equalization 2015). 
 
Effectiveness 
In terms of revenue raising, California cigarette excise taxes annually have generated 
as much as $786 million in state revenue and $350 million in local revenue (California 
Legislative Information 2015). The California Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund 
is notable because it addresses environmental damages. The actual allocation of the fund is 
unknown, but if an equal allocation is assumed across its three categories (education and 
research, medical care, and environmental damages), then the current California 
environmental mitigation fund is calculated to be $103.7 million; this covers 8.1% the 
financial costs previously calculated in this report (Appendix 16).  
A reduction in the consumption of cigarettes leads to a reduction in CFL. 
Understanding demand elasticity for cigarettes can therefore suggest how CFL generation 
changes. Performing a literature review, Chaloupka & Warner (2000) found that estimates of 
cigarette elasticity demand using individual level data generally range from -0.20 to -0.70 for 
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various age groups, meaning that if cigarette prices were increased by 10%, there would be a 
decrease in global consumption between 2-7%, or roughly 42 million smokers (Table 11). 
Although the demand curve is non-linear, it is generally purported that a 10% increase in 
price will be accompanied by a decrease in consumption between 2.5-5% (Chaloupka & 
Warner 2000). Tauras (2006) examined the impact of cigarette prices and smoke-free air 
laws on adult cigarette demand, but unlike previous studies, he allowed for the possibility 
that general sentiment toward making the laws in the first place may have confounded 
results, concluding that the true elasticity is -0.126. Ahmad & Franz (2008) determined that a 
40% tax-induced price increase would reduce smoking prevalence from 21% in 2004 to 
15.2% in 2015.  
 
Table 11. Potential global impact of 10% increase in price of cigarettes 
Non-price measures include advertising and promotion bans, consumer information, clean air 
laws, and warning labels on cigarette packs. From Chaloupka & Warner (2000). 
 
 
There are drawbacks to tax mechanisms. Tax revenue can be missed due to 
smuggling and black markets for cigarettes. Increasing tax rates on cigarettes has been shown 
to increase international and interstate smuggling (Stehr 2005, Ahmad & Franz 2008). The 
presence of smuggling complicates accurate determinations of cigarette demand elasticity—
and effectively the generation of tax revenue—because the consumption of smuggled 
cigarettes is unaccounted for and untaxed (Ahmad 2005, Stehr 2005). In addition, cigarette 
taxes have been accused of being regressive in nature, meaning that they impact a 
disproportionate number of lower-income individuals (David 2011, California Legislative 
Information 2016).  
Smuggling currently accounts for 8% of cigarette consumption in the U.S. (Ahmad & 
Franz 2008, Chaloupka & Warner 2013), and perhaps 32.7% of the cigarettes consumed in 
California were smuggled in 2012 (Henchman & Drenkard 2014). In response to smuggling, 
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enforcement efforts and penalties can be increased, although these activities place a burden 
on government resources (Ahmad & Franz 2008). The 2003 California Cigarette and 
Tobacco Product Licensing Act (Assembly Bill 71) requires that any seller of cigarettes must 
be registered with the California State Board of Equalization (Horton 2014). Every year, the 
Board of Equalization conducts 10,000 inspections to ensure compliance; in fiscal year 2004-
2005, 869 inspections showed counterfeit stamps (Horton 2014). This number decreased to 
13 in fiscal year 2012-2013; although cigarette and tobacco tax evasion still amounted to 
$214 million during this time, the program has been viewed as successful (Horton 2014).  
 
Feasibility 
The largest obstacles to increasing cigarette taxes in California are political. In 2012, 
the California ballot initiative Proposition 29 sought to raise the state tax to $1.87—and 
despite polling showing 2:1 support in favor for the initiative—tobacco companies spent 
$46.3 million to the opposition campaign, and the initiative was narrowly defeated 
(California Department of Public Health & California Tobacco Control Program 2015). In 
2015, a poll conducted by the California Wellness Foundation found that 50% of 1,555 
registered California voters would strongly support raising the state tobacco tax by $2.00 and 
that 17% would somewhat favor such legislation (Seipel & Calefati 2015).  
An significant political barrier to furthering California cigarette taxes is Proposition 
26. The 2009 passage of the San Francisco Cigarette Abatement Ordinance (discussed in the 
next section) initiated a strong political reaction from Big Tobacco (Freiberg 2013, Tobacco 
Control Legal Consortium 2014). In 2010, Big Tobacco led a front group called “Stop 
Hidden Taxes”, which—together with the alcohol and oil industries—lobbied for the 
successful passage of the statewide ballot initiative Proposition 26 (Freiberg 2013). Under 
Proposition 26, any proposed fee within the state is categorized as a tax and must receive a 
supermajority vote (>66%) from the state legislature in order to take effect (California 
Taxpayer Association 2011, Tobacco Control Legal Consortium 2014). Prior to Proposition 
26, such a fee required a simple majority vote (>50%). A supermajority is very difficult to 
obtain for any political measure—let alone a policy that involves any degree of 
controversy—according to Robert Haley, Zero Waste Program Manager at the San Francisco 
Department of the Environment (R. Haley, personal communication, April 12, 2016).  
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If it weren’t for state politics, an increase in the California cigarette tax would be a 
feasible and straightforward way to reduce cigarette consumption and CFL generation. The 
logistics and processes are already in place; it would only be a matter of increasing the 
current tax. More about California cigarette taxes will be discussed in the recent California 
legislative activity section.  
 
Fee 
 
Theory 
A fee is a market-based instrument that places a surcharge on a given commodity 
whereby the fund generated is allocated to programs that are designed to mitigate negative 
externalities caused by the taxed commodity (Smith & McDaniel 2011, Tobacco Control 
Legal Consortium 2013). So, a fee is conceptually very similar to a tax except that fee 
revenue can’t be allocated to a general fund. A fee should be designed to reasonably 
correspond to the public cost of addressing the waste problem and administering the fee 
program (Tobacco Control Legal Consortium 2013). Fees can be levied at different points in 
the value chain e.g. manufacture, distribution, wholesale, retail, and consumption (Oosterhuis 
et al. 2014).  
 
Examples 
There have been various accounts of fees placed on products that are frequently littered. 
In 2002, Ireland instituted a $0.17 levy on plastic bags whereby the revenues generated are 
remitted to the Department of the Environment, Heritage, and Local Government (Convery et al. 
2007). The policy has reported great success with low administrative costs and a 90% plastic bag 
consumption decrease by 2007 (Convery et al. 2007, Oosterhuis et al. 2014,  
Table 12, Figure 13). In 1994, Denmark placed a plastic bag tax of 22 krones (U.S. 
$3.30) per kilogram on retailers, which cut plastic bag usage by 66% by 1999 (He 2012). In 
2012, Denmark had the lowest per capital consumption rate (4 bags) and litter rate (0.5%) of 
plastic bags compared to the rest of Europe (Kasidoni et al. 2015).  
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Table 12. Fees and charges, consumption, and litter in 6 locations 
Trends show a consistent decrease in both consumption and litter. Data from Hogg et al. 
(2011), He (2012), and San Francisco Department of Environment (2016). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Plastic bags as a percentage of Ireland’s national litter composition 
Ireland implemented a plastic bag charge in 2002, which led to a 90% decrease in plastic 
bags as litter (Hogg et al. 2011).  
 
In California, statewide fees exist for commonly improperly discarded consumer 
products; examples include the Electronic Waste Recycling Fee on electronics (1995) and the 
Tire Recycling Act (1996), which currently imposes a $1.75 fee upon the purchase of a new 
tire and uses the fee revenues to fund programs that promote recycling and other alternatives 
		
41	
to stockpiling and landfilling tires (CA State Board of Equalization 2016). New Jersey 
implemented a Litter Control Fee in 2002 that applies to manufacturers, wholesalers, 
distributors, and retailers of 15 categories of litter-generating products whereby the revenue 
funds litter cleanups and municipal recycling programs (Waterfront Partnership of Baltimore 
& Abell Foundation 2011). The effectiveness of the New Jersey fee is debatable; litter rates 
in the state are close to the national average, and urban litter rates are 41% higher than the 
national average (Waterfront Partnership of Baltimore & Abell Foundation 2011).  
In 2009, San Francisco implemented the Cigarette Litter Abatement Fee Ordinance. 
The ordinance required that every pack of cigarettes sold within the city includes a $0.20 fee 
to be imposed on the consumer at the point of sale (Schneider et al. 2011). The revenue 
created by the fee is remitted to the San Francisco Office of Treasurer and Tax Collector, 
which allocates the majority of the fund to the San Francisco Department of Pubic Works for 
litter abatement—commonly referred to as manual and mechanical street sweeping—while 
the rest of the fund is allocated to the Treasury Office for administrative costs. 
It is important to recognize that the fee was designed and calculated to cover only the 
costs that the Department of Public Works had previously been spending on CFL abatement 
(Schneider et al. 2009, Schneider et al. 2011). The other financial costs associated with CFL, 
as previously discussed, were not included in this calculation (Schneider et al. 2011). The fee 
was calculated using the following methodology: in 2009, the San Francisco Department of 
Public Works had a budget of $25 million for the category “Street Environmental Services” 
which includes street sweeping, the placement and maintenance of litter receptacles, and 
graffiti abatement (Schneider et al. 2011, San Francisco Department of Public Works 2016). 
The San Francisco Department of Environment hired a consulting agency that performed a 
litter audit and determined that CFL comprised 22.5% of all litter (Schneider et al. 2011). 
Street sweeping costs for CFL were determined to be $5.6 million by assuming that the cost 
to abate CFL is about the same as the cost to abate an average mix of litter (as I have done). 
An additional $1.4 million was added in order to account for administrative costs to handle 
the abatement program—as well as an anti-littering campaign developed by the city—
yielding a total cost of $7 million (Schneider et al. 2009). Schneider et al. (2011) analyzed 
data from the U.S. Economic Census, the Center for Disease Control, and the 2007 California 
Health Interview Survey to determine that the annual per capita number of cigarette packs 
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consumed is about 31.8 in both California and San Francisco. Assuming that half of 
cigarettes are purchased outside of the city, it was estimated that 30.6 million packs are 
consumed in San Francisco annually (Schneider et al. 2011). Dividing the $7 million cost by 
the number of packs consumed yielded a per-pack fee of $0.22, and this was used to justify 
the $0.20 fee mandated by local ordinance (Schneider et al. 2011).  
On January 1, 2016, the San Francisco Office of the Controller doubled the fee to 
$0.40 (Cisneros 2015). Doubling the fee to $0.40 was justified by an analysis of the 2014 
litter audit conducted by the same consulting agency in 2009 (HDR 2014, Sabatini 2015). 
Using the same litter audit methodology, it was reported that—between 2009 and 2014—the 
ratio of CFL (compared to all litter) increased from 24.5% to 53% despite the fact that the 
volume of CFL actually decreased 24% from 2,683 to 2,057 observations (HDR 2014). This 
is explained by the dramatic 68% decrease of all litter observed from 10,970 to 3,881 pieces 
(Table 13, HDR 2014). The fee increase was also influenced by the fact that the Department 
of Public Works increased its budget for street environmental services from $25 million in 
2009 to over $37 million in 2015 (Table 15, San Francisco Department of Public Works 
2016); again, the methodology used to calculate the fee multiplied the budget by the CFL 
composition ratio. Based on these factors, the City Controller announced that a true fee to 
effectively cover CFL street sweeping costs would be $0.84 per pack but that the Controller’s 
Office decided to limit the fee to $0.40 in order to reduce market volatility (Sabatini 2015).  
 
Table 13. Characterization of San Francisco 2009 and 2014 litter audits 
Although the volume of tobacco-related litter decreased during this time, its relative 
composition increased from 22% to 53% (HDR 2014).  
 
 
  
Effectiveness 
Between 2010 and 2015, the the San Francisco Cigarette Litter Abatement Fee 
generated an annual average of $2.9 million (SD = $462,000) for the San Francisco 
Department of Public Works “Neighborhood Corridor Manual Cleaning Program”, according 
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to Shelly Ericksen, the Chair of the Hold on to Your Butt campaign, an anti-CFL advocacy 
volunteer effort supported by the San Francisco chapter of the non-profit SurfRider 
Foundation (S. Ericksen, personal communication, November 19, 2015, Table 14). This 
figure is significantly less than the $5.6 million that the fee was designed to collect for the 
Department of Public Works. Perhaps the implementation of the fee led to an increase in 
cigarette purchasing outside of San Francisco, although this is merely speculation. The street 
environmental services budget for the San Francisco Department of Public Works increased 
from $25 million in 2009 to an average of $35.9 million (SD = $2.2 million) between fiscal 
years 2012 and 2015, thereby suggesting an average CFL abatement cost of $8.1 million (SD 
= $500,000); this approximation assumes the 22.5% CFL-Litter ratio from 2009 and not the 
increase in the ratio found in the 2014 litter audit (Table 15). This implies an even larger 
differential between the desired revenue and the actual revenue raised. 
 
Table 14. San Francisco abatement fee revenue, 2010-2015 
This is the revenue allocated by the San Francisco Department of Public Works towards its 
Neighborhood Corridor Manual Cleaning Program. Information provided by S. Ericksen 
(personal communication, November 19, 2015).  
 
 
Table 15. San Francisco Department of Public Works budget for street sweeping 
As the budget increases, so should the San Francisco Cigarette Abatement Fee, according to 
the fee’s original calculation methodology. The CFL costs column assumes the 22.5% CFL-
ALR originally observed; the 2014 San Francisco litter audit observed a 53% ratio, which 
should also increase the abatement fee amount (Department of Public Works 2016, HDR 
2014). 
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It is important to understand that the fee calculation is derived from what the local 
government had previously been spending on one form of CFL abatement, not necessarily 
what should be spent for effective abatement. Even though observed CFL decreased from 
2009 to 2014, the fee was justifiably doubled because the fee calculation methodology 
involved historic data and post-hoc logic. Data is unavailable regarding CFL remediation by 
street sweeping; a back-end litter audit on the materials collected would provide valuable 
input for future research. For now, suffice it to say that a significant portion CFL is not 
remediated by street sweeping; between November 2015 and May 8, 2016, San Francisco 
volunteer organizations collected over 54,000 pieces of CFL at beaches and parks; this is an 
extremely conservative estimate because most of the clean ups did not account for CFL as a 
separate material at all (S. Ericksen, personal communication, April 15, 2016, Table 16). If 
the goal of a fee is to fund projects that mitigate the true costs of CFL, then all financial costs 
should be included in the fee calculation for a proper cost-benefit analysis. Even so, such a 
fee would not address all of the unquantifiable environmental damages caused by CFL.  
 
Table 16. CFL collected by San Francisco volunteer organizations in 2016  
The SurfRider Foundation beach performs 3 two-hour beach clean ups every month, but CFL 
is usually not collected as a separate material, so these numbers are likely to be very 
conservative (Data provided by S. Ericksen, personal communication, April 15, 2016).  
 
 
With that said, the San Francisco Cigarette Litter Abatement Fee is an innovative 
policy measure that creates a model from which other CFL abatement fees can be built. The 
fee places a financial disincentive on the consumer and contributes to a fund designed to 
mitigate CFL damages, thus creating an element of product stewardship (which will be 
discussed in detail later).  
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Feasibility 
Devising a proper fee for California fundamentally requires two inputs: the financial 
costs CFL creates for the state and the number of packs of cigarettes consumed in California. 
Financial costs to the state of California caused by CFL have been calculated to be $1.227 
billion. To determine California cigarette consumption, the Schneider et al. (2011) 
methodology is used, multiplying the per capita pack of cigarette figure (31.8) to the 
population of California to yield 1.25 million packs; dividing the CFL-related financial costs 
to the state by the number of packs consumed yields a California Cigarette abatement fee of 
$1.03 (Appendix 17). Perhaps a more appropriate statewide fee calculation would only 
consider abatement costs. Using the same methodology, an appropriate California cigarette 
abatement fee would be $0.69 (Appendix 18).  
One potential challenge with a statewide CFL fee mechanism is the equitable 
allocation of the revenues across the stakeholders that pay the costs to mitigate CFL. The cost 
of implementation, or cost efficiency, for allocating scare resources—such as public funds—
is an important factor that determines the effectiveness of a market-based instrument 
(Oosterhuis et al. 2014). From an administrative standpoint, it could be difficult and 
expensive to determine how to fairly allocative the fund across local governments, 
businesses, educational institutions, and non-profit organizations.  
With that said, fees face similar challenges as taxes in California due to Proposition 
26. Under Proposition 26, a policymaker can establish that any levy, charge, or exaction is a 
fee, rather than a tax, if and only if it abides by the following qualifications: 1) the charge is 
used to specifically and exclusively benefit the people who pay the charge; 2) the 
government imposing the charge can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
charge is reasonable in amount and effect, and; 3) the fee falls under an exception outlined in 
Proposition 26. A California CFL mitigation fee would benefit a variety of stakeholders—not 
exclusively the smokers who pay the fee—so such a fee would qualify as a tax under 
Proposition 26. Also, it would easy for opponents to claim that the government’s charge is 
not reasonable in amount and effect by a preponderance of the evidence because—as has 
been discussed here—such a calculation is inherently complicated. So, despite the San 
Francisco abatement fee being grandfathered in, any further attempt at implementing a 
cigarette fee in California, either locally or statewide, would be politically challenging.    
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Charge 
The terms “tax”, “fee”, and “charge” are often used interchangeably throughout the 
literature; however, in California, a charge is differentiated from a tax or a fee, and this can 
make a big difference in terms of political feasibility. Unlike taxes and fees, in California, 
charges are not remitted to governing agencies but rather kept by retailers (State Board of 
Equalization 2011, R. Haley, personal communication, April 24, 2016). In effect, although a 
charge should influence consumption just as a tax or a fee would, a charge does not create 
revenue for government funds. Charges are not subject to the supermajority vote requirement 
that Proposition 26 requires of proposed fees in California (R. Haley, personal 
communication, April 24, 2016). The revenue raised by a charge is not included in the 
retailer’s gross receipts and is not subject to sales or use tax (State Board of Equalization 
2011). Therefore, proposed charges should receive less political pushback from entities 
representing local business interests. So, charges are tools that can reduce the consumption of 
products with relative political ease.   
 
Examples and Effectiveness 
Most of the plastic bag bans in the U.S. simultaneously place a charge on the 
allowable alternative bags—such as paper, compostable bags, and recycled content bags— 
with the intention to further encourage the use of re-usable bags (San Francisco Department 
of the Environment 2016, Surf Rider Foundation 2016). After San Francisco implemented 
such a policy in 2007 for supermarkets and retailers, bag litter in the city decreased from 
4.4% composition to 4.2% in 2009 (HDR et al. 2009, San Francisco Department of the 
Environment 2016). In 2014, New Jersey attempted to pass a $0.05 fee/charge mechanism on 
all disposable bags in certain commercial entities whereby $0.01 would be kept by the 
retailer and $0.04 would be remitted to the State Department of Environment (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2015). Although the bill died in the State Senate, the duality 
of the payment mechanism is noteworthy as a possible strategy for policy decision making.  
Because most of the literature uses the terms “charge” and “fee” interchangeably, 
there is little available data regarding charges as defined in California. The clarification is 
identified here to highlight a potentially politically feasible means to introduce a market-
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based instrument to cigarettes in California—bypassing the requirements of Proposition 26—
therefore reducing the consumption of cigarettes and the generation of CFL.  
 
Price Floor 
A price floor mandate on the sale of cigarettes is another potential avenue to reduce 
cigarette consumption without involving Proposition 26. Price floors can be established by 
legally requiring minimum percentage markups throughout the cigarette distribution chain 
and/or by prohibiting trade discounts from cigarette manufacturers to wholesalers and 
retailers (Ribisl et al. 2010). In 2010, 25 U.S. states had minimum price laws for cigarettes 
(Ribisl et al. 2010). As recently as March 2016, the northern California Sonoma County 
Board of Supervisors approved an ordinance that would set a $7 price floor on a pack of 
cigarettes starting in the year 2018 (Hart 2016). Price floors should reduce consumption as 
per demand elasticity, although literature regarding price floors is lacking; more research 
should be conducted to determine how price floors affect consumption and revenue 
generation (Ribisl et al. 2010). More about California price floors will be discussed in the 
recent California legislative activity section.  
 
Regulatory Policy Instruments 
Now that the category of market-based instruments has been assessed, this section 
evaluates the other major policy category that could effectively mitigate CFL—regulatory 
instruments. Whereas market-based instruments are designed to reach goals by creating 
market price signals, regulatory instruments take a more direct government approach by 
requiring certain standards to be met by stakeholders involved with a product, system, or 
activity that produces negative externalities (Keohane & Olmstead 2007). These stakeholders 
could be virgin material extractors, product manufacturers, transporters, distributors, 
retailers, consumers, and/or waste haulers. Regulatory policy is sometimes referred to as 
“command-and-control” or “prescriptive policy” and it is generally more resource-intensive 
to administer—compared to market-based instruments—because it involves setting 
standards, monitoring activities, and enforcing penalties for non-compliance. Here, three 
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subsets of regulatory instruments will be evaluated: consumer behavior regulation, extended 
producer responsibility / product stewardship, and product prohibition. These options will be 
assessed using the same format as that of the previous section: theory, examples, 
effectiveness, and feasibility with California.  
 
Consumer Behavior Regulation 
This section discusses policy options that regulate consumer behavior. I will discuss 
locational smoking bans, minimum purchasing age requirements, and littering fines. These 
options tend to place burdens on local governments and may be costly to enforce and 
administer.  
 
Locational Smoking Bans   
 
Theory  
Due to the negative effects of secondhand smoke on human health and the quality of 
life, there have been many behavioral smoking bans in the U.S. since the 1980’s (Novotny et 
al. 2009). Behavioral restrictions are laws designed to prevent certain environmental and 
human health risks from occurring. If such a regulation is violated, then a penalty is 
administered to the bad actor(s). Past research has suggested that the adoption of such bans 
create a change in social norms about smoking and reduce its acceptability (Klein et al. 
2006). 
 
Examples 
Federal law prohibits smoking within any indoor educational facility or library that 
has access for children (Holtby et al. 2011). In 1995, California became the first state to ban 
smoking in all enclosed workplaces; restaurants and bars were exempted until 1998 
(California Air Resources Board 2015). Whereas indoor smoking bans have been 
implemented to protect human health, outdoor smoking bans have generally been 
implemented to address littering. Maine has prohibited smoking in all state parks and 
beaches, and various U.S. municipalities have banned smoking in parks and beaches (Barnes 
2011). In 2004, the California State Senate attempted to ban smoking on all 64 state parks 
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and beaches, but the bill failed by two votes (Novotny et al. 2009). Then, in 2010, a 
California law prohibiting smoking in all states and beaches passed both legislative bodies, 
but it was vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger, who stated that a more effective approach 
would be to increase the fines and penalties already established in the littering laws (Barnes 
2011). In 2004, California Assembly Bill 846 banned smoking with 20 feet of all public 
buildings and within all state owned vehicles (Vincent 2003). Smoking is prohibited on the 
premises of licensed childcare centers, within 25 feet of a playground, as well as within a 
motor vehicle in which a minor is present (Holtby et al. 2011). On May 4, 2016, California 
Assembly Bill 7 was signed by Governor Brown, extending the workplace ban to include 
owner-operated businesses and excluding previous exemptions such as certain bars and 
gaming clubs (Adler 2016); this will be discussed further in the recent California legislative 
activity section.  
 
Effectiveness 
Compliance with indoor smoking laws has been successful in the U.S., reaching 90% 
within 3 months in New York City and Boston, and 99% in restaurants in California (Klein et 
al. 2007). Clean indoor air laws predict lower average daily smoking among adults, although 
smoke-free air laws generally do not predict smoking prevalence (Tauras 2006). It is possibly 
problematic that indoor smoking bans may exacerbate CFL prevalence by forcing people to 
smoke outside; one case study performed in the U.K. found that CFL increased 43% after an 
indoor smoking ban was introduced (Novotny & Slaughter 2014). Also, jurisdictions with 
laws regulating indoor smoking are correlated with having a higher number of fires 
(Markowitz 2013).  
 
Feasibility  
Indoor smoking bans have already been successfully implemented in California. It is 
certainly feasible that California could pass a state or assembly bill that prohibits smoking in 
all state parks and beaches so long as the governor does not veto it. Like anti-littering 
penalization, enforcement is a key ingredient for the effectiveness of an outdoor smoking 
ban. Prohibitions on smoking behavior have been legally challenged on the grounds that 
smokers have a constitutional right to due process of the law and equal protection; however, 
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these challenges have generally failed because smoking is not a protected right under the 
U.S. Constitution (Tobacco Control Legal Consortium 2013). Local jurisdictions have the 
ability to implement stricter smoking behavior regulations, and at least 32 California cities 
and counties have done so (Novotny et al. 2009). In addition, local communities and 
landlords also have the right to prohibit on premise smoking (Novotny et al. 2009). 
 
Minimum Age Requirement 
Another behavioral regulatory instrument is setting the minimum age at which a 
person can purchase cigarettes. Because most people begin smoking between the ages of 15 
and 17—which is when they are most susceptible to becoming addicted (Institute of 
Medicine 2015)—the theory of raising the purchasing age is to decrease consumption by 
preventing smokers from getting addicted at an early age. I was able to locate one piece of 
grey literature that discussed the effectiveness of raising the smoking age to 21, finding that 
the adult smoking prevalence decreased 50% over 10 years since the policy was adopted in 
the town of Needham, Massachusetts (Feferberg 2015). One drawback of this policy 
mechanism is that it may take many years to take effect. In California, one benefit is that the 
policy is not subject to Proposition 26.   
In January 2016, Hawaii became the first U.S. state to raise the age from 18 to 21 
(Feferberg 2015). In June 2016, San Francisco will join more than 100 other U.S. cities in 
doing the same (Tinker 2016). In fact, by June 9th, the entire state of California’s minimum 
cigarette purchasing age will be raised to 21 due to Governor Browns’ signing of Senate Bill 
7 on May 4, 2016; this is a very significant development that will be discussed in the recent 
California legislative activity section.  
 
Littering Fines 
 
Theory 
A penalty is a financial disincentive designed to reduce a targeted behavior or activity 
placed on consumers when a behavior, such as littering, violates a law (Oosterhuis et al. 
2014). Policymakers are challenged with setting the appropriate level of a penalty in order to 
achieve a given target (Oosterhuis 2014). The level can be based on a variety of criteria, 
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including costs of damages produced by the targeted behavior, legal limits or precedents 
administered elsewhere, and/or an affordability basis (Ten Brink et al. 2009). Penalties vary 
widely depending on the jurisdiction and the scope of the problem (Ten Brink et al. 2009).  
 
Examples 
All U.S. states have anti-litter laws, but penalties differ widely based on the type, 
amount, and location of litter generated (Schultz & Oleen 2014). In some states, the severity 
of the littering penalty is determined by weight, whereas in others, volume is the determining 
factor (Schultz & Oleen 2014). The California penal code states that it is unlawful to litter 
and that the fine for a first offense must be between $250 and $1,000; second offense 
penalties must range between $500 and $750, and third (and subsequent) convictions require 
a fine between $750 and $3,000 (California Legislative Information 2007). Novotny et al. 
(2009) stated that fines for littering may be as high as $1,000 in some states, and importantly, 
that fines could be levied by states or municipalities “against cigarette manufacturers based 
on the amount of cigarette waste found either as litter or as properly disposed waste”. Barnes 
(2011) stated that a reward of 50% of an administered fine can be granted to a person who 
gives information leading to an arrest and conviction of a littering party. However, I could 
not locate cases of these two latter assertions in the literature.  
Paris has received recent media attention by ramping up its enforcement of 
administering €68 ($76) litter fines for cigarette filters in particular (The Local 2015). It is 
reported that 3,900 Paris employees collect 350 (metric) tons of CFL annually (The Local 
2015), but supporting data is unavailable, and the effectiveness of the enforcement is 
unknown. It is interesting to note that Paris installed 30,000 “ashtray bins” to encourage 
smokers to discard CFL properly (The Local 2015); the provision of this kind of 
infrastructure will be discussed in the product stewardship section.    
 
Effectiveness 
Anti-littering laws are generally poorly enforced (Barnes 2011, Ten Brink et al. 2009, 
Novotny & Zhao 1999). The California Highway Patrol is responsible for enforcing littering 
laws on highways throughout the state, but relatively few tickets are administered because 
the violation must be observed in progress (Gordon 2006). Between 1998 and 2005, the 
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Washington State Department of Ecology (2007) conducted various focus group studies on 
littering behavior and determined that the primary motivation that would encourage litterers 
not to litter would be the realistic threat of being caught and fined. Threats of fines are 
commonplace in litter prevention programs, but there are few systematic evaluations of their 
efficacy; threats may even exacerbate littering behavior (Keep America Beautiful & Action 
Research 2009). Enforcement is essential for an effective implementation of a penalty 
mechanism (Ten Brink et al. 2009).  
 
Feasibility 
Littering fines could very well be an effective and feasible policy tool to mitigate 
CFL in California. The policy already exists; as previously stated, enforcement is what needs 
to happen. Various consulting and government reports highly recommend enforcement 
strategies and offer appropriate mechanisms for penalizing CFL, including making 
enforcement visible (Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs 2007, New South 
Wales EPA 2013, Ueda et al. 2011, California Tobacco Control Program 2013). Through 
civil action, the offense of littering needs to be made a priority to both local council and 
enforcement officers. Before implementing enforcement mechanisms on littering, 
municipalities usually make a public announcement about the new law and allow for an 
arbitrary grace period of enforcement to take effect; some municipalities run awareness-
raising media campaigns as well (Ueda et al. 2011). Gordon (2006) suggested increasing 
anti-litter enforcement by authorizing citizen monitoring, implementing a uniform reporting 
procedure and reporting hotline, and deputizing citizens in local communities as “trash 
police”.  
It is proposed here that the penalty for CFL is exempted from California penal code 
section 374.4 so that the fine can be lowered. I submit that law enforcement officers 
generally aim to keep good relations with the citizens whom they serve and that a $250 fine 
for CFL is excessive. If littering fines were lowered to $50 to $100 (like in Paris), then they 
would be easier to administer because the fine would match the crime. In the U.K., penalty 
notices that allow for a degree of flexibility for penalty amounts—including a reduced rate 
for early payment—have been suggested as an effective anti-litter mechanism (Department 
for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs 2007). Once the quantity of administered fines 
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increases, awareness about the issue should motivate smokers to litter less; however, the 
extent of this behavior change, as well as its timeliness, is uncertain. Although enforcement 
requires resources, the money generated by CFL fines could generate revenue for local 
enforcement agencies.  
 
Discussion: Producer Pays Principle  
I will transition now from consumer to producer regulation by discussing the polluter 
pays principle in brief. The polluter pays principle is the regulatory concept that the costs of 
the pollution (a negative externality) that an entity emits—typically a commercial producer—
should be fully incorporated into the market price for goods and services produced by that 
entity (Oosterhuis 2014). These costs can be internalized through penalization or through 
litigation. Witkowski (2014) discussed the possibilities of legally challenging cigarette 
manufacturers to pay for the negative externalities created by CFL, although such legal 
action is unprecedented; cigarette manufacturers claim to relinquish responsibility for CFL 
once the product is transferred to the consumer (Curtis et al. 2014). Penalties are placed on 
producers when regulatory standards determined by the government are violated, such as 
emission standards, product standards, or ambient environmental quality standards (Keohane 
& Olmstead 2007, Ten Brink et al. 2009). Penalties do not directly affect market prices; 
however, the enforcement (or threat) of a penalty may incentivize a commercial polluter to 
administer resources towards mitigating the polluting behavior, and these resources may 
indirectly raise market prices. Or, a commercial polluter may choose to continue paying 
pollution penalties if a cost-benefit analysis deems the behavior profitable; the penalization 
costs should indirectly raise market prices in this scenario as well (Keohane & Olmstead 
2007). The following section discusses options for internalizing negative externalities 
through regulatory policy aimed at producers and other responsible entities.   
 
Extended Producer Responsibility and Product Stewardship 
 
Theory 
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is an environmental policy protection 
strategy designed to reduce the impact of a consumer product by making a manufacturer 
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legally responsible for the product’s entire life-cycle, including its post-consumption life 
stage (Javadian et al. 2015, Curtis et al. 2014). This is sometimes known as “cradle-to-grave” 
responsibility (Hunt et al. 1992, Figure 14). EPR regulates toxic and environmentally 
unsustainable materials materials that pollute and litter the environment (Curtis et al. 2014). 
By making producers responsible for the economic, physical, and informational handling of 
consumer goods, the net negative externalities caused by the consumer good are reduced to 
the public (Curtis et al. 2014). Lindhqvist (2000) identifies the following three core tenants of 
EPR: 1) an internalization of the costs associated with negative environmental externalities 
into the retail price of a product; 2) a shift of the economic burden associated with the 
management of toxicity and other environmental damages towards producers and away from 
local governments, and; 3) a provision of incentives for producers to adopt more sustainable 
design throughout a product’s life cycle. It should be noted that when an EPR system creates 
financial responsibility for a producer, price signals may be indirectly created.  
 
 
Figure 14. General flow for “cradle-to-grave” materials management 
There are various stages in a consumer product’s life cycle. Extended producer responsibility 
attempts to make producers and manufacturers responsible for all stages, particularly the 
post-consumption disposal stage (Hunt et al. 1992).  
 
Product stewardship is a closely related concept to EPR, the difference being that 
product stewardship allocates responsibility not just to producers but also to various 
stakeholders involved in the product’s life cycle such as growers, designers, distributors, 
sellers, disposers, and/or consumers (Curtis et al. 2016). The responsibility is allocated based 
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on the extent to which a particular stakeholder has the ability to create or reduce the negative 
externalities that a consumer product creates (Curtis et al. 2014).  
For the purposes of this study, the general concepts of EPR and product stewardship 
are similar enough that they will be assessed here in tandem as “EPR-PS”; differentiations 
will be acknowledged when relevant. EPR-PS has historically been implemented through 
mandatory and/or voluntary take-back programs whereby manufacturers, importers, 
distributors, or retailers responsibly recover a product (Oosterhuis et al. 2014). The 
government typically establishes recycling rate targets for specific materials, and to meet 
these requirements, industries or businesses may be required to form a separate entity 
referred to as a producer responsibility organization. EPR-PS are designed to effectively 
ensure the safe recovery of materials. The application of EPR-PS principles to CFL 
mitigation policy may create residual public health outcomes by: 1) de-normalizing tobacco 
use; 2) increasing the price of tobacco products; 3) enacting new tobacco product regulations 
to make cigarettes less marketable; 4) strengthening anti-litter and outdoor smoking 
prohibitions, and; 5) creating new alliances with environmental advocacy and tobacco control 
groups (Curtis et al. 2016). Examples of EPR-PS systems will now be identified and assessed 
for effectiveness. Then, an EPR-FS system for CFL in California will be assessed for 
feasibility.  
 
Examples 
Due to declining landfill capacity, European nations have generally led the way with 
EPR-PS legislation (McKerlie et al. 2006). The German Green Dot model is another well-
known, successful, noteworthy EPR model; however, the Green Dot model deals with 
recyclable and/or reusable packaging materials, and it falls outside of the scope of this 
assessment. The Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), however, 
deals with potentially hazardous materials, and it will be now discussed in brief.  In 2003, the 
European Union member states implemented the WEEE Directive and its accompanying 
Directive on the Restriction of certain Hazardous Substances. The directive required 
producers of electronic consumer products to clearly label their products and inform 
consumers that the product must be handled outside of the landfill waste stream (McKerlie et 
al. 2006). Consumers were mandated to be able to return WEEE to collection points free of 
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charge, and producers bore all costs for recovery (McKerlie et al. 2006). Producers were also 
made responsible for taking back “orphaned waste”, meaning obsolete WEEE consumer 
goods produced before the directive was passed (McKerlie et al. 2006). The legislation also 
mandated the phase out of certain known toxic ingredients in the production process for 
electronic consumer goods, such as lead, cadmium, mercury, hexavalent chromium, and 
certain brominated flame retardants (McKerlie et al. 2006).  
 In the U.S., EPR-PS systems are more patchwork and less stringent when compared 
to European efforts. The Product Stewardship Institute is a non-profit organization that works 
with government, private sector, and non-profit partners to implement systems in the 33 U.S. 
states where EPR-PS legislation has passed (Curtis et al. 2016). As of October 2010, 32 U.S. 
states had implemented laws requiring manufacturers to finance the costs of recycling and 
safe disposal of consumer products such as auto switches, batteries, carpet, cellular phones, 
electronics, fluorescent lighting, mercury-containing thermostats, paint, and pesticide 
containers (Barnes 2011). These systems, as well as the WEEE Directive, are more 
applicable to a proposed model for CFL because of the hazardous nature of the materials that 
they are designed to recover.  
The California Product Stewardship Council is a network of local governments, non-
government organizations, businesses, and individuals that advocates for EPR-PS programs 
(Sanborn 2016). The council currently facilitates such statewide programs involving 
troublesome materials including batteries, carpet, fluorescent lamps, paint, mattresses, 
pharmaceuticals, sharps, and thermostats (Sanborn 2016). In 2007, California Assembly Bill 
2449 required that large grocery stores and pharmacies have a take-back program for plastic 
grocery bags and other kinds of plastic film (California Ocean Protection Council 2008). In 
2015, San Francisco passed the Safe Drug Disposal Stewardship Ordinance, requiring 
producers of prescription and/or over-the-counter medicines sold in the city to participate in 
an approved stewardship program for the collection and disposal of unwanted medicine from 
residential sources (San Francisco Department of Environment 2016, P. Ojea, personal 
communication, April 21, 2016). The ordinance has yet to be fully implemented, but due to 
the size and scope of pharmaceutical consumer products, there could be lessons learned and 
applied to a CFL EPR-PS program regarding infrastructure, outreach, collection, and creation 
of the stewardship organization. 
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Effectiveness 
EPR-PS systems create significant potential economic benefits for local governments 
and taxpayers by diverting and recovering hazardous waste materials with financial support 
from responsible entities (Wagner 2013). In Vancouver, EPR-PS systems have been 
estimated to annually divert 165,000 tons of materials from collection and disposal systems 
to product stewardship management systems, translating to at least $22 million in savings to 
local governments in addition to reduced environmental liability and regulatory risks 
(McKerlie et al. 2006). Through conducting waste composition studies, EPR-PS systems 
have been found to significantly decrease the presence of hazardous waste materials as well 
as recyclable material such as metal, glass, and plastic containers (McKerlie et al. 2006).  
The WEEE and Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directives is credited to have 
had an immediate global impact on the product design of electronics, particularly by phasing 
out lead solder and polybrominated diphenyl ethers (McKerlie et al. 2006). However, due to 
the continued increase in the global production of electronic consumer products, the disposal 
of WEEE products has been estimated to have increased between 16-28% between 2002 and 
2007 (Ongondo et al. 2010). Recycling mandates are not ordinarily designed to curb usage 
(Smith & McDaniel 2011); this is a potential argument against EPR-PS legislation for CFL. 
In Germany, the program has been estimated to responsively recover 50-63% of targeted 
materials (Ongondo et al. 2010).  A major global concern is the environmental impacts 
caused by WEEE entering landfills (Ongondo et al. 2010). In the U.S., it is estimated the 
over 102.5 billion toxic cigarette filters are annually discarded “properly” into the landfill 
stream (Table 1); based on this volume, cigarette filters deserve attention considering their 
potentially toxic effects on landfills.    
 
Feasibility 
There is enough groundwork to implement an EPR-PS model for CFL. Barnes (2011) 
argued that an effective CFL EPR-PS system should follow the 2011 Maine Product 
Stewardship Law; this would require the tobacco industry to institutionalize a stewardship 
organization that submits a plan to the government as to how CFL would be responsibly 
recovered. Curtis et al. (2016) developed a guiding framework to institutionalize an EPR-PS 
		
58	
system in order to mitigate CFL. Its core provisions draw upon the Oregon PaintCare law 
which requires paint manufacturers to finance and operate a system for retrieving, 
transporting, and processing leftover paint. In effect, a stewardship organization, funded by 
the cigarette industry, would submit to the government various accountability measures such 
as plan approvals and amendments, goals and performance standards for material recovery, 
education and outreach programs, annual reports, annual stakeholder meetings, and privacy 
considerations (Curtis et al. 2016). The main benefit of such a system would be to recover 
CFL and therefore mitigate its presence in the environment. A residual benefit could be 
substantial data collection regarding CFL generation. Although a CFL EPR-PS model could 
be resource-intensive to develop—particularly in terms of up front governmental 
administrative costs—over time, the idea is that relevant stakeholders will fund the program.   
In December 2015, the California Department of Public Health funded a project that 
developed specific language written as an ordinance designed to legally codify such a 
program; nuances of the ordinance are clarified in detail, and the authors encourage 
California jurisdictions to incorporate the model ordinance into their respective legal codes 
(ChangeLab Solutions 2015). This “Model California Ordinance Regulating Tobacco Waste” 
would make it illegal for any cigarette brand to be sold in a jurisdiction unless the 
manufacturer or distributor created or joined a product stewardship program. Cigarette 
manufacturers would be required to submit a plan that includes how CFL is collected, how 
the program would reduce CFL, and how the collected CFL would be disposed. The 
jurisdiction could set performance measures. Manufacturers would be required to perform 
outreach efforts regarding how to properly dispose of CFL. Manufacturers would be 
responsible for covering all costs associated with collecting, transporting, and disposing the 
CFL as well as the costs incurred by the jurisdiction in implementation and enforcement. A 
manufacturer could opt out of the program by paying an in-lieu fee to the local jurisdiction. 
The jurisdiction would calculate the amount of the fee by considering both the total costs 
incurred by the government to mitigate CFL as well as the percentage of market share that a 
particular cigarette brand has in the jurisdiction. The methodologies used earlier to calculate 
CFL abatement costs for government entities could be a useful tool for determining 
appropriate in-lieu fees.  
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Alternatively, if CFL were recognized as a household hazardous waste, then it would 
be legally required to a have a responsible recovery system in place. The U.S. EPA defines 
household hazardous waste as having a chemical nature that can poison, corrode, explode, or 
ignite easily when handled improperly while also having the potential to be generated in a 
residence (U.S. EPA 2016). It is important to note that “household hazardous waste” is a 
separate category from “hazardous waste”—which refers to byproducts from manufacturing 
and/or production processes—and the two are treated very differently for regulatory 
processes (California Department of Toxic Substances Control 2016). In 1986, California 
Assembly Bill 1809 required local government agencies to identify programs for household 
hazardous waste. The California public resources code (section 47000-47004) mandates that 
the state should assist the efforts of local governments and other agencies to provide 
responsible disposal systems for household hazardous waste. In California, it is illegal to 
dispose of household hazardous waste in the landfill, down the drain, or by abandonment 
(California Department of Toxic Substances Control 2016). Assembly Bill 1809 established 
guidelines and state policies for local governments to provide community services for 
household hazardous wastes, authorized cities and counties to increase fees or rates charged 
for services that responsibly recover the materials, and required public education concerning 
household hazardous substances (CalRecycle 1997). Assembly Bill 888 (1989) required local 
agencies to implement household hazardous collection, recycling, and disposal programs 
(CalRecycle 1997). The major drawback to this approach, however, is that once a material is 
recognized as a household hazardous waste, its disposal becomes heavily regulated; legally, 
volunteer organizations would not be permitted to abate CFL if it were considered as 
household hazardous waste, according to Maggie Johnson, Residential Toxics Reduction 
Coordinator for the San Francisco Department of the Environment (M. Johnson, personal 
communication, May 12, 2016).  
 
Discussion: Outreach and Consumer Education 
If an EPR-PS system were implemented for CFL, one potentially problematic point of 
contention could be the extent to which producers should fund and/or perform consumer 
outreach about the negative externalities created by CFL. Barnes (2011) stated that the 
unique issues surrounding the disposal of cigarette filters would require the stewardship 
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organization to include extensive consumer education about the environmental hazards of 
CFL as well as better enforced penalties for improper disposal. Essentially, the issue boils 
down to the extent to which consumers are responsible for creating CFL.  
Proponents of CFL EPR-PS systems have reported how the tobacco industry has 
funded studies designed to prove that smokers litter in order to avoid producer responsibility 
(Novotny et al. 2009, Smith & McDaniel 2010, Smith & Novotny 2010). This was discussed 
earlier in the Keep America Beautiful discussion section. In spite of this observation, or 
perhaps because of it, these proponents have tended to ignore consumers’ littering behaviors 
and attitudes as a significant contributing factor to the problem. Although Curtis et al. (2016) 
admitted that enforcement of a CFL EPR-PS system may be challenging due to smokers’ 
lack of adherence to litter laws, the authors did not acknowledge consumers as a responsible 
entity in the EPR-PS schematic. Rather, the authors suggested that consumers should be 
induced to comply through better anti-litter law enforcement. Here, I submit that smokers do 
litter and should accordingly be given a degree of financial responsibility in an equitable 
EPR-PS system. Walls (2006) makes the case that the advanced recycling fee mechanism—
whereby a tax is assessed on product sales and remitted to an entity that responsibly recovers 
the product—qualifies as an EPR mechanism. Such a fee can be assessed upstream on 
producers and effectively be incorporated into the product retail price or it could be assessed 
downstream on consumers at the point of sale as a separate line item (Walls 2006). The latter 
option is similar to the fee market-based instrument discussed earlier, and it allows for an 
allocation mechanism for equitable financial responsibility in an EPR-PS model.  
To what extent will outreach and education influence littering behavior? The 
evidence is mixed regarding smokers’ knowledge and attitudes about the environmental 
impacts of CFL. Some smokers believe that certain brands of cigarettes, such as Camel, 
contain cotton, biodegradable filters (Smith & Novotny 2011). Rath et al. (2012) cited two 
surveys which reported that a majority of smokers perceive CFL as biodegradable and one 
survey that reported the opposite finding. It must be noted that the definition of 
biodegradability is not clarified. Even those considered to be well-informed on the subject 
matter have varying perceptions about CFL’s impacts. Javadian et al. (2015) surveyed 350 
members of the Framework Convention Alliance which included mainly non-governmental 
tobacco control advocacy groups that support the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
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Control. 73% considered CFL to not be biodegradable. When asked who should be 
responsible for the remediation of CFL, 72% responded “smokers”, 62% responded 
“cities/communities”, and 77% responded “the tobacco industry”. Rather et al. (2012) 
concluded that most of the smokers who litter do consider CFL to be litter, and the authors 
suggested—as originally submitted by Dr. Thomas Novotny, the primary CFL research 
scientist in the field—that the term “litter” does not properly convey the toxic, damaging 
nature of cigarette filters and that the term “waste” may be more appropriate.  
Witkowski (2014) held that although cigarette manufacturers are not littering 
themselves, it is reasonably foreseeable that the smoker is likely to do so; even if the 
manufacturers made the argument in court that the smokers’ littering behavior were an 
intervening action—thus eliminating proximate cause responsibility for the manufacturer—
such a lack of control of this behavioral misuse is not an absolute bar to liability for the 
manufacturer. Interestingly, Witkowski (2014) assessed the possibilities of litigation in the 
form of a public nuisance offense; in this case, a government could sue the cigarette 
manufacturing industry in order to hold producers liable for the damages incurred by CFL. 
This possibility would validate the polluter pays principle. I recommend that future research 
investigates such legal strategies.  
  
Discussion: Infrastructure 
The availability and convenience of collection infrastructure is a key factor in 
determining the effectiveness of an EPR-PS system (Wagner 2013). EPR-PS frameworks 
require participation from consumers, who must segregate the material and transport it to a 
specifically designated collection site (Wagner 2013). EPR-PS generally requires the creation 
of a separate and often parallel convenient collection system for a targeted material—as is the 
case for Connecticut and Maine state law—although the definition of convenience is not 
defined (Wagner 2013). Wagner (2013) performed a thorough and comprehensive analysis of 
EPR-PS collection systems and concluded that the key factors influencing consumer 
convenience are: 1) knowledge of the collection system; 2) proximity to a collection site; 3) 
available times to drop off materials; 4) the desirability of the collection site, and; 5) the ease 
of the drop off process. Here, the feasibility of CFL infrastructure will be discussed.  
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Various studies have suggested how both the availability and proximity of waste 
receptacles are correlated with lower littering rates (Finnie 1973, Geller et al. 1979, Meeker 
1997). Littering rates typically decrease as the provision of proper receptacles increases 
(Cope et al. 1993, Geller et al. 1979, Geller et al. 1982). These studies have also found that 
brightly decorated receptacles significantly reduce litter. As discussed earlier, some 
proponents of EPR-PS have discredited Keep America Beautiful studies that have shown the 
importance of infrastructure for recovering CFL, claiming that the results are used to shift 
responsibility away from cigarette manufacturers and towards local governments, which are 
typically responsible for the provision of waste receptacles (Barnes 2011). However, the 
Keep America Beautiful findings are not wrong; people litter less when more receptacles are 
provided. The real question for policy makers is: how should the permitting, installation, and 
maintenance of such infrastructure be equitably funded in a CFL EPR-PS system?  
Regardless of how the responsibility is allocated, any CFL waste collection system 
should be cost effective and practical. Thankfully, recent technologies, systems, and 
companies have developed that can streamline an EPR-PS system for CFL. TerraCycle is an 
American business that utilizes innovative technologies in order to recycle notoriously 
difficult-to-recycle items; the company currently recycles cigarette filters into plastic pellets 
to make industrial products like shipping pallets (Yi 2014). To date, TerraCycle has designed 
and installed over 300 CFL receptacles in 13 North American cities (TerraCycle 2016). In 
November 2013, the City of Vancouver, Canada, installed 100 CFL receptacles purchased 
from TerraCycle for $12,000 and by June 12, the city had collected 200 pounds, or 
approximately 5,300 pieces of CFL (City of Vancouver 2014, Appendix 19). The receptacles 
were serviced by a non-profit recycling organization that works with disadvantaged people 
from the neighborhood (Meisner 2013). Kreisman (2014) estimated that the efficacy of this 
pilot program was between 3% to 6%, although the definition of “efficacy” was not clarified.  
Sidewalk Buttler has installed 100 CFL receptacles in Portland, Maine, collecting 
over 400,000 butts in one year, according to the company’s owner, Mike Roylos (M. Roylos, 
personal communication, April 7, 2016). The maintenance of the Sidewalk Buttler 
receptacles is streamlined using a mobile application that monitors the fullness and frequency 
of service for each receptacle using geo-location (M. Roylos, personal communication, April 
7, 2016). This data collection model can suggest where to best strategically place receptacles. 
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It could also be used to develop a mobile application to show smokers where CFL 
receptacles are located on a digital map.  
Another bottom-up approach to streamline CFL infrastructure could utilize data 
provided by the mobile application Litterati, which builds geo-spatial “litter profiles” and a 
digital database of litter based on user photographs and material-specific tags, according to 
the company’s founder and owner, Jeff Kirschner (J. Kirschner, personal communication, 
April 8, 2016). The Litterati database currently contains over 202,000 data entries, of which 
approximately 16.6% are CFL (Appendix 3). Litterati could be used to geo-locate high 
impact CFL areas, and infrastructure could be placed there accordingly.  
Another approach could utilize data provided by Marah & Novotny (2011), who 
developed top-down model to predict high impact CFL areas using Geographic Information 
System software. The researchers utilized census data of business such as bars, convenience 
stores, cafes, and gas stations to predict where CFL is most likely to occur (Figure 15). Then 
the model was tested with litter collection audits, and the average number of CFL found in 
the high-predicted areas (38.1, SD = 19.9) was found to be statistically significant when 
compared to that of the low-predicted areas (4.8, SD = 5.9). The authors concluded that CFL 
was highly correlated with businesses that sell cigarettes. This finding raises the question: to 
what extent should sellers be responsible for implementing a CFL EPR-PS system?  
  
 
Figure 15. G.I.S. model designed to predict CFL in San Diego 
This model utilizes census data to predict high impact CFL areas. When matched with a litter 
audit, its predictability was found to be statistically significant (Marah & Novotny 2011).  
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Novotny & Zhao (1999) recommended that worksites and public buildings be 
encouraged or required to supply CFL receptacles, and indeed some jurisdictions mandate 
the provision of CFL receptacles in local code. The San Francisco Public Works Code, article 
5.1 (section 173) explicitly states that any person, firm, corporation, or property owner 
operating a place of employment must provide and maintain “sufficient ashtrays or other 
receptacles for the disposal of cigarettes, cigars, and other similar combustible products used 
by employees and patrons who smoke” adjacent to the place of employment (American 
Legal 2015). The design, capacity, location, and number of ashtrays and receptacles are 
prescribed by the Director of Public Works. Interestingly, this law is not limited to businesses 
that sell cigarettes. Although there is no data available on the matter, there is a consensus that 
this law is poorly enforced (S. Ericksen, personal communication, March 25, 2016). If an 
EPR-PS system for CFL were implemented, enforcement of the law that mandates the 
provision of CFL receptacles is imperative—regardless of how responsibility is allocated to 
businesses, producers, and/or governments for the provision.   
 
Design for Environment 
 
Theory 
“Design for environment” is a tenant of EPR-PS that is conceptually distinct from the 
systems discussed so far. The design for environment concept suggests that if a consumer 
product creates negative externalities throughout its lifecycle, then producers should research 
an alternative, more sustainable design for the product (Wagner 2013). In other words, 
policies should incentivize producers to incorporate environmental considerations into the 
design of their products (Walls 2006). The application of sustainable i.e. biodegradable 
design to cigarette filters has been mentioned as a possible option to mitigate CFL (Novotny 
& Zhao 1999, Novotny et al. 2009). Such a practice could be mandated by law, and this 
policy option will now be assessed.  
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Examples 
In the 1990’s, the tobacco industry formed the “Cigarette Butt Degradability Task 
Force” through its international research organization, CORESTA (Novotny et al. 2009). Its 
goal was to develop a biodegradable filter for marketing purposes in order to prepare for the 
industry being regulated for filter biodegradability standards (Novotny et al. 2009, Smith & 
Novotny 2011). The task force admitted that CFL degradation could take “many months or 
even years, depending on environmental conditions” and so it sought to develop an 
accelerated test to provide consistent results (Cigarette Butt Degradability Task Force 2000). 
However, the effort failed and the task force disbanded due to an inadequate level of interest 
(Cigarette Butt Degradability Task Force 2000).  
There is a company in the U.K. called Green Butts that has developed a cigarette 
filter made out of cotton, hemp, flax, and an all-natural starch binder that degrades between 2 
and 6 weeks, meaning that its residual tensile strength is reduced by 90% or more (Donahue 
2014). It does not appear that Green Butts has taken its product to market.  
 
Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of a biodegradable filter is questionable at best in terms of reaching 
policy goals. Although the negative externality of plastic litter would be reduced, it is 
unlikely that designing biodegradable filters would mitigate the risks associated with 
chemicals absorbed into the filter from cigarette combustion (Curtis et al. 2014). Curtis et al. 
(2014) stated that incentivizing cigarette producers to incorporate a sustainable design for 
filters is “unachievable given the toxic, hazardous chemicals permanently embedded in the 
tobacco product”. In jurisdictions with composting policy and infrastructure, consumer 
awareness of CFL toxicity and biodegradability could create problems if smokers were to 
discard CFL into the compost stream.  
 
Feasibility 
It would be political unfeasible for any state to try to incorporate product standards 
for biodegradable cigarette filters due to federal preemption by the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 which granted the FDA the sole authorization 
to regulate product standards (Freiberg 2013). These product standards are indicated to 
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include the construction, components, ingredients, additives, constituents, and properties of 
the product (Freiberg 2013). So, the application of sustainable design to cigarette filters is 
deemed both unfeasible and ineffective in terms of mitigating CFL in California.    
 
Deposit-Refund 
A deposit-refund system places a visible surcharge (deposit) on a consumer good at 
the point of purchase for a given commodity; once the commodity is returned at an 
established collection point, the deposit is refunded to the consumer (Kulshreshtha & Sarangi 
2001). Typically, an initial deposit is paid for by the manufacturer or the distributor and is 
passed down through the value chain to the consumer (Figure 16). The goal of a deposit-
refund system is to incentivize material recovery so that a product is not sent to the landfill or 
disposed of as litter (Hogg et al. 2011). The incentive is particularly appropriate for materials 
with hazardous contents or materials that are frequently littered or otherwise illegally 
disposed (Hogg et al. 2011). Unredeemed deposits can be used to finance programs that 
mitigate a negative externality, such as anti-litter outreach and education programs (Numata 
2009). In other cases, such as in Germany, surplus deposits are kept by retailers 
(Rademaekers et al. 2011). Deposit-refund systems fall under the umbrella of EPR-PS; they 
involve the consumer for participation, non-profit recycling centers for operations, and 
government agencies for authorization and subsidization.  
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Figure 16. Flow chart for deposit-refund payout structure 
Distributors typically pay the deposit amount to the governing agency and then pass the cost 
down to the retailer, which in turn passes the deposit amount onto the consumer (Container 
Recycling Institute 2007).  
 
Examples 
Deposit-refund systems have been utilized for beverage containers, lead-acid 
batteries, motor and lubricating oils, tires, white goods (such as refrigerators, stoves, and 
washing machines), electronics, automobiles, and various hazardous materials (Ten Brink et 
al. 2009, Walls 2011). Legislation that creates deposit-refund systems for beverage 
containers are known as “bottle bills” (Novotny et al. 2009). The U.S. began passing bottle 
bills in the 1970’s and today there are 10 states, as well as Guam, which implement bottle 
bills that vary according to materials handled as well as pricing (Container Recycling 
Institute 2016). The following European nations have deposit-refund systems for beverage 
containers: Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden 
(Rademaekers et al. 2011, Ten Brink et al. 2009). In California, of the 18 billion beverage 
containers recycled annually, about 90% have been processed through a recycling center 
certified by the state bottle bill (Collins 2016).  
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Effectiveness 
For the intents and purposes of this project, the deposit-refund model would probably 
be the most effective policy mechanism in terms of litter mitigation. After implementing 
bottle bills, 7 U.S. states reported lowered littering rates for beverage containers (Table 17). 
Hawaii, the most recent state to adopt a bottle bill, saw a 60% reduction in beverage 
container litter between 2005 and 2008 (Waterfront Partnership of Baltimore & Abell 
Foundation 2011). Beverage container litter is about 30% lower in Canadian provinces with 
mandatory bottles bills compared to provinces without them (Curtis et al. 2014). Germany 
originally adopted a system where containers could only be returned to the point of sale; 
when this was changed to a multi-point refund system, recycling rates went from 20% to over 
98% (Rademaekers et al. 2011). 
 
Table 17. Litter reduction after implementing deposit-refund programs 
Bottle bills have consistently shown a decrease in litter after implementation (Reclay 
StewardEdge 2014).  
 
 
 
Bottle bills have also been successful in terms of increasing recovery and recycling. 
The Oregon bottle bill is credited for having increased container recycling to 90% and for 
having reduced roadside litter of bottles from 40% to 6% (Novotny et al. 2009). Malta has 
had a similar recover rate of 90% (Ten Brink et al. 2009). U.S. states with bottle bills have 
recycling rates of 84%, 48%, and 65% for aluminum, polyethylene terephthalate (PET), and 
glass bottles, respectively, as compared to the recycling rates of non-bottle bill states with 
rates of 39%, 20%, and 25% (Gitlitz 2013, Table 18). California’s decentralized deposit-
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refund model generates a large stream of post-consumer material with minimal 
environmental impact and that the locations of reclamation centers are the most significant 
factor influencing post-consumer impacts (Kuczenski & Geyser 2012). The manufacture of 
beverage containers from recycled content—when compared to the same manufacture from 
virgin resources—saves energy, emits fewer greenhouse gases, and utilizes natural resources 
more efficiently (Gitlitz 2013). Also, there is evidence that bottle bills reduce the number of 
lacerations caused by broken glass in the environment (Hogg et al. 2011).  
 
Table 18. Recycling rates of bottles: states with and without bottle bills 
Bottle bills have consistently shown an increase in recycling after implementation (Gitlitz 
2013). 
 
 
However, administrative and operational costs are relatively high for a deposit-refund 
system (Rademaekers et al. 2011). Saphores et al. (2014) argued that—based on a 2006 
national survey on recycling attitudes—deposit-refund systems are not very effective because 
of limited scope, a relatively low refund per container, and opposition from beverage 
manufacturers. Nahman (2010) stated that a South Africa government-operated deposit-
refund system for plastic bags was ineffective in terms of creating a viable plastic bag 
recycling industry, implying that industry initiatives are more effective than government 
regulation for stimulating the recovery of packing waste for recycling.  
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A variety of factors can influence deposit-refund effectiveness, including the pricing 
of both deposits and refunds, the entity that is remitted surplus deposits, the geographic 
distribution of collection points, and the marketability of the collected materials. In terms of 
reducing consumption, a returnable deposit on cigarettes could reduce smoking if the deposit 
were large enough (Khalili et al. 2013); I recommend that future studies measure the 
elasticity of demand before and after a deposit-refund model is implemented because this 
data is lacking. Deposit-refund systems become more effective when the value of secondary 
PET plastic outweighs the associated costs of producing PET from virgin materials 
(Kuczenski & Geyser 2012). Deposit-refund programs also produce net positive job creation 
(Reclay StewardEdge 2014).   
In California, the bottle bill directly employs at least 3,000 people, generates over $8 
million in state tax revenues annually, and channels a million tons of scrap materials away 
from landfills (Collins 2016). However, the system is currently facing problems. The 
California Department of Resource Recycling and Recovery, known as CalRecycle, 
subsidizes recycling centers’ operations, but due to a continued fall in scrap commodity 
values as well as a fundamental flaw in CalRecycle’s method that determines appropriate 
subsidization amounts, recycling centers have not received the subsidies that they require in 
order to operate (Collins 2016). On January 31, 2016, the state’s largest beverage recycling 
company closed 191 recycling centers and laid off 278 employees; more than 400 
redemptions have been closed in 2016 (Collins 2016).  Additionally, it is possible that 
California loses $50 million annually from illegal interstate beverage container smuggling 
operations (Moffitt 2015). In 2010, California authorities arrested 32 people in five separate 
smuggling cases and estimated that those people had altogether defrauded the state out of 
more than $10.5 million (Jenkins 2011). Smuggling and funding are both important issues 
when gauging the effectiveness and feasibility of a deposit-refund model for CFL in 
California. To prevent illegal redemptions, CalRecycle pre-certifies all recycling centers, 
administers maximum daily redemption load limits (by weight), and authorizes vehicle 
inspections (CalRecycle 2016).  
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Feasibility  
The could be some feasibility issues with the logistics of a CFL deposit-refund 
system. I submit that the existing recycling facilities for beverage containers could 
additionally be utilized for CFL, although the handling of CFL—both by collectors and by 
recycling operators—could raise legitimate health concerns and is seen as a challenge that 
could ultimately decrease its feasibility (Tobacco Control Legal Consortium 2013, Curtis et 
al. 2014). Smuggling would be a financial (although environmentally beneficial) threat, as 
the small size that makes filters easier to handle also makes them easier to transport illegally. 
As opposed to beverage containers, CFL does not have value as a commodity; this condition 
is not a prerequisite for a feasible deposit-refund model (Kreisman 2014). Indeed, lessons 
learned from the California bottle bill suggest that the funding mechanism for such an 
operation should be independent of commodity values. With that said, the system could be 
more cost-effective if CFL was worth something. There are indeed applications for cigarette 
filters that could create a market demand, such as inhibiting corrosion on steel pipes (Zhao et 
al. 2010), conducting heat for clay-fired bricks (Sarani & Kadir 2015), and serving as an 
insecticide for mosquito larvae (Dieng et al. 2013). TerraCycle is willing to pay $1.00 for 
every pound of CFL to strategically partnered registered non-profit organizations and schools 
in certain locations (S. Ericksen, personal communication, March 25, 2016). One man in San 
Diego created a recycling system that pays $3 per pound of CFL (Karlman 2012), but like 
TerraCycle, this does not qualify as a robust market. With that said, there is potential that 
CFL could one day function as a commodity.  
Politically, attempts to implement a CFL deposit-refund model have been blocked. In 
2001, Maine state representatives Joseph Brooks and Scott Cowger proposed a Returnable 
Tobacco Bill that would implement a deposit-refund system for CFL (Lee 2012, J. Brooks, 
personal communication, April 1, 2016, S. Cowger, personal communication, April 1, 2016). 
Consumers would have deposited and refunded $0.05 for each cigarette, which would be 
specially stamped for eligibility in the program (J. Brooks, personal communication, April 1, 
2016). As the collected CFL was to be sent to incineration plants or landfills, the system was 
not designed to recycle CFL but rather to remediate it from the environment (J. Brooks, 
personal communication, April 1, 2016, S. Cowger, personal communication, April 1, 2016). 
The bill did not receive much support as there was disagreement from various industry 
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associations, the governor, as well as the Maine Bureau of Health, which feared that children 
would collect the CFL and be repeatedly exposed to nicotine (J. Brooks, personal 
communication, April 1, 2016, S. Cowger, personal communication, April 1, 2016). New 
York State Senator Toby Ann Stavisnky has had two similar attempts sponsoring legislation 
that would institutionalize a CFL recycling program using a deposit-refund model, and 
currently she is sponsoring another, Senate Bill S3425, which is in the early stages of the 
legislative process (New York State Senate 2016). In California, Proposition 26 could legally 
challenge a deposit-redemption model for CFL in California (Freiberg 2013), although such a 
challenge is unprecedented.  
Like the other EPR-PS options, a deposit-refund model for CFL is risky compared to 
other policy options. I submit that California is too big of a state for such a system to be 
piloted. With that said, I propose that a CFL deposit-refund model (a “butt bill”) be piloted in 
Hawaii. Hawaii is heavily hit by CFL; during the 2007 International Coastal Cleanup, CFL 
comprised 44.7% of all land-based items and 12.3% of all underwater items observed in the 
state (State of Hawaii 2008,  
 
 
 
 
Table 19). Hawaii is the most recent state to adopt a bottle bill, and its 106 certified 
recycling centers could be utilized to collect CFL (State of Hawaii 2008). Also, as a group of 
islands, Hawaii has a natural aversion to interstate smuggling.  
If such a system were implemented, it is recommended that the deposit-refund price 
model involve phases in order to avoid bankruptcy to the system caused by refunding the 
CFL that existed before the policy was adopted—referred to as “orphaned” butts (Kreisman 
2014). For example, a deposit of $0.05 per cigarette could initially refund $0.01 per filter; 
then as orphaned butts are redeemed over time, the deposit amount could gradually decrease 
to $0.01, or the refund amount could gradually increase to $0.05 (S. Chiv, personal 
communication, February 17, 2016). To protect against smuggling, the state should follow 
CalRecycle and implement certification standards and maximum weight limits. Ultimately, 
the operation could be funded by responsible stakeholders, particularly producers.   
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Table 19. Top 5 litter items found in Hawaii in 2007 
Hawaii has a very high CFL-ALR: 44.7% on land and 12.3% underwater. Notice how much 
larger the land cleanup sample size is. This data was originally provided by the Ocean 
Conservancy’s International Coastal Cleanup (State of Hawaii 2008).  
 
 
Product Ban 
Theory 
When a product is deemed to be particularly damaging, presenting unreasonable risks 
to health or the environment, governments can restrict or eliminate the manufacture, sale, 
distribution, consumption, or disposal of that product (U.S. Congress 1995). Product bans 
can prevent pollution and littering by eliminating or limiting the products that create 
unnecessary and adverse environmental risks (U.S. Congress 1995). In theory, a ban is 
appropriate when it is cost-effective; it should be well-tailored to a given situation, whereby 
the product’s use poses unacceptable risks and limited benefits (U.S. Congress 1995). With 
that said, product bans may have unintended impacts and should be thoroughly reviewed 
before implementation (Ten Brink et al. 2009). 
 
Examples 
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On a federal level, the U.S. EPA and the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 
have the authority to prohibit consumer goods deemed to be so dangerous that labelling the 
product is not adequate enough to protect consumers (U.S. Product Safety Commission 
2012). An extensive list of all banned products in the U.S. is available on the U.S. Consumer 
Product Safety Commission website (U.S. Product Safety Commission 2012). Historically, 
California product bans have involved single products, although recently the California 
Department of Toxic Substances Control has initiated a process to identify, prioritize, and 
potentially ban product categories (Raphael 2013). When a product ban is imposed before the 
product is introduced into a marketplace, a government regulatory agency reviews the 
product’s risks for damages and places limits that are designed to bring such risks to a 
reasonable level (U.S. Congress 1995). Historically, though, product bans and limitations 
have been implemented after the products were well-distributed through commerce and 
already causing problems (U.S. Congress 1995). 
Prohibition on products that pollute and/or litter the environment has been more 
recent. Expanded polystyrene (commonly referred to as the brand Styrofoam ™) bans have 
been implemented in at least 10 U.S. states; there have been at least 65 local ordinances in 
California, including San Francisco in 2007 (Surf Rider Foundation 2016), which became the 
first major American city to ban single-use plastic bags at supermarkets and drugstores 
during the same year. Since then, 118 similar ordinances have been passed in the state, 
covering 147 local jurisdictions, and at least 16 other states have passed local bag ban 
ordinances (Californians Against Waste 2016, Surf Rider Foundation 2016). In October 
2015, California became one of the nine U.S. states to ban the production and/or sale of 
microbeads. Microbeads are plastic fragments ranging in size from 5 µm to 1 mm and are 
considered to be a primary source of micropastics, as opposed to CFL which is a secondary 
source of microplastics (Rochman et al. 2015). The phase-out of microbeads in California 
would have begun in the year 2020 (Willon 2015, Trager 2016); however, only two months 
after the state law was passed, the federal Microbead-Free Waters Act was approved by 
Congress, effectively phasing out the manufacture of personal care products and cosmetics 
containing microbeads in July 2017, the sale of cosmetics in July 2018, and the sale of over-
the-counter drugs in July 2019.  
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Effectiveness 
In San Francisco, during the two years after the plastic bag and expanded polystyrene 
bans were implemented, the percentage of retail plastic bag and polystyrene litter decreased 
respectively by 18% and 41% compared to the amount of all large litter observed (Table 20). 
In the two years since the plastic bag ban in Guam, diversion of plastic bags from landfill 
increased from 11% to 32% (Blumenfeld 2016). I have been unable to locate further 
information regarding the effects that product bans have on litter.  
 
Table 20. Street litter before and after San Francisco product bans 
The change in observed street litter in plastic bags and expanded polystyrene during the 2 
years after the products were banned locally (HDR et al. 2009).  
 
 
 
Feasibility  
California could simply ban the sale of filtered cigarettes if a significant and 
avoidable environmental and human health hazard were determined (Curtis et al. 2014, 
Novotny & Slaughter 2014). Although the California Ocean Protection Council (2008) stated 
that a ban on filtered cigarettes is inappropriate because filters “perform an important 
function”, the Surgeon General has reported in various accounts that not only have cellulose 
acetate cigarette filters shown no benefit to human health, but that they may even contribute 
to a histologic shift in the predominant lung cancer found in smokers from squamous cell to 
the more aggressive adenocarcinoma (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2010, 
Novotny & Slaughter 2014, Curtis et al. 2016). Therefore, filtered cigarettes are certainly not 
necessary, but rather avoidable. A legitimate concern with banning filtered cigarettes would 
be a further increase the littering behavior of consumers. Like the design for environment 
option, a product ban would mitigate the negative externalities associated with plastic litter, 
but it is unclear how toxic risks would be mitigated. I submit that there may be multiple ways 
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that California could ban filtered cigarettes—either through state legislation or through a 
state government agency—and I will now discuss each in turn with further analysis.  
 
California Product Ban Options 
 
State legislation may be a relatively feasible option to ban filtered cigarettes. 
Proposition 26 does not affect a product ban. The California microbeads ban was a 
significant piece of state legislative prohibition designed to protect environmental damage; 
Rochman et al. (2015) offered a concise and comprehensive explanation about the scientific 
evidence used to support the microbeads ban as well as the political movement that 
successfully led to its passage. Lessons can be learned from the microbeads ban case and be 
applied to a ban on filtered cigarettes. Other lessons learned may come from the California 
plastic bag ban, Senate Bill 270, which is currently going through the political process. After 
a decade of lobbying by environmentalist constituencies, the California bag ban passed 
through the state senate and was signed by Governor Brown in 2014 (Lapis 2016). However, 
in March 2016, the plastic bag lobby, led by the American Progressive Bag Alliance, 
acquired enough signatures to place the bill on the ballot as a veto referendum, effectively 
delaying its implementation until November 2016 when voters will decide if Senate Bill 270 
takes effect; the bag lobby has spent over $3.2 million campaigning against the bill (Lapis 
2016). Any constituencies hoping to ban filtered cigarettes in California must be prepared to 
deal with similar resistance from Big Tobacco.  
In January 2014, California Assemblyman Mark Stone introduced Assembly Bill 
1504, a piece of legislation designed to prohibit the sale, gifting, or furnishing of all 
cigarettes with single-use filters in the state, subject to a $500 penalty (California Legislative 
Information 2015). The bill was voted down in the legislative process in May 2014; 
opposition argued that such a policy would: 1) not necessarily reduce litter; 2) increase fire 
risks; 3) violate the U.S. Tobacco Control Act of 2009 by mandating a product standard; 4) 
essentially prohibit cigarette sales because virtually all cigarettes sold in the state contain 
filters; 5) lose the state hundreds of millions of dollars of tax revenue, and; 6) increase 
smuggling and induce a black market for filtered cigarettes (California Legislative 
Information 2015). There is no evidence to support arguments 1 and 2. Argument 3 will be 
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addressed in the next paragraph. Argument 4 carries little weight, as cigarettes could still be 
sold so long as they did not contain filters. Argument 5 is unfounded; in fact, the health costs 
of tobacco consumption far outweigh any revenue collected from tobacco taxes (Brossart et 
al. 2014). Argument 6 is the only argument that may have some validity.  
Argument 3 refers to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act—
discussed previously in the design for environment section—which pre-empts regulatory 
powers to the FDA over state laws regarding the manufacture, components, ingredients, 
additives, constituents, and properties of a cigarette (Freiberg 2013). However, the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act expressly granted local enforcement 
agencies—such as state and municipal governments—the authority to regulate the 
distribution, possession, sale, advertising, promotion, and fire safety of cigarettes (Curtis et 
al. 2016, Freiberg 2013). So, although the tobacco industry could legally prevent California 
from requiring cigarette manufacturers to produce unfiltered cigarettes, California has the 
authority to prohibit the sale of filtered cigarettes in the state (Freiberg 2013).  
Assemblyman Stone attempted to re-introduce a statewide product ban on filtered 
cigarettes in December 2014, this time including enforcement provisions to address the 
potential threat of black markets for filtered cigarettes (California Legislative Information 
2016). Despite findings that recent safeguards have proven effective in preventing black 
market evasion of cigarettes, AB 48 died pursuant to Article IV, Section 10(c) of the 
Constitution in January 2016 (California Legislative Information 2016, Horton 2014). It must 
be noted that the cigarette industry has had a long and powerful influence in state and federal 
politics, where financial resources and lobbyists work against tobacco control efforts 
(Mondardi & Glantz 1998). Policy decision makers that have received campaign 
contributions from Big Tobacco have been found to vote against tobacco control policies 
(Bialous et al. 2001). In 2006 and 2010, the tobacco industry contributed $2.3 million and 
$2.8 million, respectively, to California legislators and lobbyists (California Tobacco Control 
Program 2015). Challenges from the cigarette industry are to be expected; indeed, such 
challenges can be viewed as a sign of effectiveness for efforts by tobacco control advocates 
(Brossart et al. 2014).   
Alternatively, it may be possible for a ban on filtered cigarettes to happen through the 
California Department of Toxic Substances Control. In 2013, the CDTSC began 
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implementing the Safer Consumer Products Regulations, requiring manufacturers and other 
responsible entities to seek safer alternatives to harmful chemicals used in a variety of 
products (Raphael 2013). This authority includes the regulatory power of product 
information, use restrictions, product sales prohibition, end-of-life product management 
programs, and the advancement of sustainable alternatives. The regulatory framework 
involves identifies “priority products” that are defined as containing one or more 
chemicals—called “candidate chemicals”—that have a hazard trait that can harm human 
and/or environmental health (California Department of Toxic Substances Control 2016). CFL 
may have the potential to qualify as a priority product. The regulation of filtered cigarettes 
through the California Department of Toxic Substances Control could be a more realizable 
approach compared to state legislation due to an avoidance of the legislative political 
process. Witkowski (2014) discusses in detail the possibility of using California hazardous 
waste law to address CFL. 
Discussion: Federal Legislation 
 
Before concluding, it should be recognized that federal programs exist that aim to 
mitigate litter in California. The federal taxes that Californians pay for these programs have 
not been included in my financial costs section. The Clean Water Act and the Coastal Zone 
Management Act will now be briefly discussed to provide context about current federal 
efforts to mitigate litter in California. These efforts are expensive and remedial in nature (as 
opposed to preventative) although there may be lessons learned from these federal policies 
for California decision makers moving forward.  
 
Clean Water Act 
The U.S. Clean Water Act requires every state to set water quality standards which 
designate appropriate uses for a given water body, define the pollutants in that water body, 
nominate the streams from which each pollutant is generated, set an acceptable total 
maximum daily load for the pollutant, and incorporate mandatory measures such as discharge 
permits as well as best managing practices—such as structural retrofits and operational and 
behavioral changes—to mitigate the pollutant; this process may take 6 to 8 years 
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(Blumenfeld 2016, Herzog 2015). Los Angeles has been innovatively applying the Clean 
Water Act regulatory power to litter in municipal storm water systems (Herzog 2015). U.S. 
EPA Region 9, which includes California, set a “zero trash” (zero litter) goal for the Los 
Angeles River by 2016. The California State Water Board set the total maximum daily load 
for trash in the Los Angeles River in 2002, and its implementation took effect in 2008 
(Herzog 2015, U.S. EPA Region 9 2016); it required that trash be reduced by 40% below a 
calculated baseline in the first year of compliance and an additional 10% for each following 
year. Twenty-two local jurisdictions sued the U.S. EPA, arguing that the goal of “zero trash” 
is unreasonably expensive, if not impossible (Herzog 2015).  
California has surpassed its obligations, having prevented more than 1.2 million 
pounds from entering waterways and reducing trash entering the Los Angeles River by 69% 
(National Ocean Council 2011, U.S. EPA 2016). Nearly 100,00 full capture devices have 
been installed, as well as “trash booms” designed to capture litter at outfalls (Herzog 2015). 
Some jurisdictions have reduced waterway litter pollution by 98% (Blumenfeld 2016). On 
April 7, 2015, the California State Water Board adopted what is known as “The Trash 
Amendments”, which has the objectives to provide statewide consistency for the regulatory 
approach to protect aquatic life and public health, to reduce environmental issues associated 
with trash in state waters, and to focus its limited resources on high trash generating areas 
(De la Paz Carpio-Obeso & Perreira 2015). Herzog (2015) suggested that future policies 
could shift the responsibility of financing trash total maximum daily load compliance 
towards producers of commonly littered items, thus incorporating a product stewardship 
framework that eases financial burdens on governments and incentivizes alternatives for 
environmentally damaging products.   
 
Coastal Zone Management Act 
The Coastal Zone Management Act was enacted by Congress in 1972 and amended in 
1990 by the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments. The amendments require that 
all coastal states with approved coastal zone management programs must address nonpoint 
pollution impacting or threatening coastal water quality by developing a Coastal Nonpoint 
Control Protection Program (Gordon 2006). Such a program identifies urban areas as one of 
the five main sources of nonpoint water pollution and also identifies litter as a pollutant that 
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is carried by urban runoff (Gordon 2006). It is the responsibility of the State Water Resources 
Control Board and the California Coastal Commission to identify pollutant source categories 
and implement management measures; currently, 28 state agencies are working through the 
Interagency Coordinating Committee to implement the plan which includes a Model Urban 
Runoff Program that guides local governments how to develop, finance, implement, and 
enforce a comprehensive program to manage storm water pollution (Gregg & Fagundes 
2016). These costs may be substantial, and I recommend that future research quantitatively 
assesses the extent to which federally-mandated litter remediation programs are costing 
California. 
Discussion: Recent California Legislative Action 
 
On May 4th 2016, six proposed tobacco control regulation policies survived the 
California legislative process, and Governor Brown signed five of them into action (Adler 
2016). Senate Bill 7 will raise the minimum cigarette purchasing age to 21 years old for the 
entire state (with active duty military personnel exempted). This is a big step towards 
mitigating cigarette consumption with the only drawback of requiring time to take effect. 
Assembly Bills 7 and 9 will extend smoking bans in owner-operated businesses, bars, 
gaming clubs, charter schools, district offices, and vehicles. Clean indoor air laws are 
correlated with lower average daily smoking among adults (Tauras 2006) although they may 
increase littering when people are obliged to smoke outdoors (Novotny & Slaughter 2014). 
Assembly Bill 11 will increase tobacco licensing, distributor, and wholesaler fees, essentially 
raising the price floor on cigarettes throughout the state. Governor Brown vetoed Assembly 
Bill 10, which would have allowed counties to tax the distribution of cigarettes, subject to 
voter approval. Although the California constitution prohibits the legislature from imposing 
local taxes, the legislature may authorize local governments to impose them (California 
Legislative Information 2016). I submit that the governor recognized the pushback that Big 
Tobacco would have given if he had signed Assembly Bill 10—either in the form of a ballot 
referendum or legal recourse—which may conflict with the requirements set forth by 
Proposition 26. Notwithstanding, this is a very exciting time for tobacco control regulation 
policy in California as scientists, consultants, and politicians are recognizing the importance 
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of mitigating the negative externalities caused by cigarette consumption—and acting 
accordingly.  
 
V. Conclusion  
 
The negative externalities caused by CFL warrant policy action towards its mitigation 
in the State of California. Financially, CFL costs the state over $1.227 billion annually; 67% 
of these costs come in the form of abatement, 26% in the form of damages to the tourism 
industry, 4% in the form of damages caused by fires, and 4% in the form of damages to the 
fishing industry. Other damages to society are intangible and/or unquantifiable, including 
child ingestion and the diminishment of the quality of life. CFL poses environmental risks by 
emitting toxic leachate, serving as source of plastic ingestion to animals, and degrading into 
microplastics. 
Policy instruments aim to internalize the costs that CFL places on society. Each 
option has advantages and disadvantages (Table 21). Market-based instruments, such as 
taxes, fees, charges, and price floors reduce consumption of cigarettes. Market-based 
instruments are beneficial because they involve relatively low intervention from governing 
agencies, and they may raise revenue for the government. With that said, market-based 
instruments do not have specific goals in terms of litter mitigation, and they do not address 
the core issues of responsible recovery and consumer behavior. Also, market-based 
instruments may encourage cigarette smuggling and tax evasion. In California, taxes and fees 
may be politically unfeasible due to Proposition 26.   
Regulatory policy instruments set, monitor, and enforce specific goals. The drawback 
is that regulatory policies involve more governmental resources. Consumer behavior 
regulations include locational bans, minimum age purchasing requirements, and littering 
fines. These policies are relatively feasible so long as they are enforced appropriately. 
Extended producer responsibility and product stewardship programs, including a deposit-
refund model, provide the main benefit of recovering litter. However, these mechanisms do 
not aim to reduce consumption. Also, they are untested for CFL and may involve operational 
and administrative uncertainties. Product bans are relatively straightforward, especially 
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because cigarette filters have shown no benefit to human health. However, although banning 
filtered cigarettes would mitigate certain environmental risks, it is unclear whether the option 
would mitigate toxic environmental risks. The same is true for a mandate that would require 
cigarette manufacturers to design a compostable filter.  
 
Table 21. Policy option pro’s and con’s 
A summary of available policy options to mitigate CFL. The advantages and disadvantages 
of each pertain to the scale of California.  
 
 
This is an innovative and exciting time for tobacco product control policies in 
California. Combining the efforts of environmental advocates and human health advocates 
may be the best strategy to mitigate the negative externalities caused by CFL.  
 
Management Recommendations 
Effectively mitigating CFL in California may involve implementing a variety of 
policy tools. For any other state, taxes and fees would be recommended as a feasible option. 
In California, acquiring a supermajority vote in the legislature is difficult, but not impossible. 
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With that said, Proposition 26 is relatively new and has not been tested thoroughly in the 
legal system. There may be ways around it depending exactly on how a market-based 
instrument is administered, and subjection to Proposition 26 may ultimately depend on a 
judge’s discretion. For now, the safe strategy would be to continue raising price floors and 
administering charges, although these options do not generate government revenues. Future 
policy strategies may depend on how Big Tobacco reacts from the recent California tobacco 
control regulations. 
Regarding consumer behavior regulations, raising the purchasing age to 21 should 
reduce consumption, although it will take time and will not address social norms regarding 
CFL. Locational bans will address this latter point, although indoor smoking bans may 
increase outdoor littering. Effectively, enforcing littering fines is instrumental. This goes to 
say no matter what other policies are adopted. I recommend that CFL is exempted from the 
California penal code so that littering fines can be lowered and more easily administered. 
Such enforcement could also be more reasonable if collection infrastructure were established 
through an EPR-PS system.  
Implementing an EPR-PS program—either in the form of a product stewardship 
organization or a deposit-refund model—would be most effective at mitigating CFL although 
such a program is not recommended to be piloted at the scale of California due to uncertain 
administrative and operational risks. I do recommend that such a model be piloted within a 
smaller scale (state), particularly Hawaii. Once a proof of concept is established, based on the 
effectiveness of such a pilot, lessons could be learned and the model could be expanded to 
other states. A deposit-refund model for CFL is particularly intriguing, especially if the 
program were funded by entities that generate CFL such as producers, consumers, and 
possibly sellers and other entities involved in the product life cycle. If CFL were 
scientifically assessed as a household hazardous waste that creates a toxic liability for 
landfills, then an EPR-PS system would be the most appropriate option to responsibly 
recover the material. The design for environment tenant of product stewardship is not 
recommended for cigarette filters because it is both politically unfeasible at a state level and 
because it would not mitigate toxic externalities. It also could encourage littering behavior.  
These previous points are also true for a product ban, which would in itself not be 
compatible with a deposit-refund model nor a product stewardship organization for practical 
		
84	
purposes. With that said, if policy makers decided to take the legislative approach to banning 
filtered cigarettes—as has been attempted twice in the state—I recommend that lessons be 
learned from the state microbeads ban which involved the cooperation of grassroots level 
advocacy groups, multinational corporations, and governments. The alternative approach 
would be to administer a product ban through the California Department of Toxic Substances 
Control; this strategy would bypass the legislative process, although such an attempt is 
unprecedented.  
Future scientific research should investigate the toxic effects of unsmoked filters, 
filter biodegradation, and the toxic impact of CFL on landfills. Other potentially valuable 
research pursuits would include determining further applications of CFL for marketability, 
determining demand elasticity before and after deposit-refund models are implemented, 
conducting street sweeping audits to see the composition of the collected debris, and 
determining how labelling might affect cigarette consumption. I also recommend that further 
research and development goes into technologies that could streamline CFL infrastructure in 
a PS-EPR system.  
 It is generally recommended, for both environmental and financial reasons, that 
policies designed to mitigate CFL prioritize prevention ahead of remediation. The Ocean 
Conservancy has remediated 52 million filters over 27 years (Curtis et al. 2016) but trillions 
are littered annually; this status quo is unsustainable and unacceptable. The inherent nature of 
the environmental and financial damages caused by CFL is going to require the continued 
cooperation between health and environmental advocates, innovation from technology 
developers and policy makers, and the political will to ensure an acceptable level of health 
for the State of California.   
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